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to protect and nurture the global family, 
to support its weaker members and 
to preserve and tend to the environment  
in which we all live.’ 
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INTRODUCTION 
Whenever events or a proposed change in policy affect quality or availability of 
environmental resources and public goods, either explicit or implicit cost-benefit 
analyses must often be undertaken. It has been recognised that the value of these 
goods is not explicitly determined through market transactions and the absence of 
markets makes it extremely difficult to establish a monetary value for access to these 
goods. Economists answered this challenge by developing methods of nonmarket 
valuation for public goods. Methods for valuing environmental goods have been 
categorized as indirect and direct. 
Direct methods, as the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM), ask consumers 
what they would be willing to pay (WTP) or accept (WTA) for a change in an 
environmental amenity. They are examples of stated preference techniques that 
establish hypothetical markets for public goods. Direct methods have the main 
advantage that they allow the measurement of non-use values but they are commonly 
criticised because of the hypothetical nature of the question (i.e. ‘hypothetical bias’) 
and the fact that the actual behavior is not observed. Researchers have identified also 
other problems and biases, such as strategic bias1, information bias2, and starting 
point bias3 (see detailed discussion of the problems in Cummings et al., 1986 and 
Mitchell and Carson, 1989).  
                                                 
1 For example if respondents believe they will have to pay for the good then respondents may not be 
willing to reveal their true WTP and their responses may be unrealistically low. 
2 Valuation may depend on how the information about the good, its provision and financing is 
provided, who makes the interview or what other information the respondents have about a particular 
good. 
3 It is possible that when follow-up questions are used, respondents may ‘anchor’ the value they place 
on the policy on the bid amounts proposed to them in the initial and/or subsequent payment questions. 
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To investigate the validity of direct methods, researchers have compared the 
WTP estimates derived by applying the CVM with the WTP estimates based on 
indirect methods of valuation (Bishop and Heberlin, 1979; Bishop et al., 1983; Seller 
et al. 1985; Cameron, 1992; Adamowicz et al., 1994; Carson et al., 1996; Azevedo et 
al., 2003). Indirect methods, such as the Travel Cost Method (TCM), use actual 
choices made by consumers. These constitute revealed preferences over goods. The 
basic premise of the TCM is that the time and the travel cost expenses that people 
incur to visit a site represent the price of access to the site. The WTP to visit a site is 
estimated based on the number of trips that people make at different travel costs. The 
TCM avoids the criticism of being based on hypothetical behavior but it has other 
problems such as how to handle multiple-day trips, how to value time costs, how to 
choose the functional form of the demand for trips and how to incorporate temporal 
uncertainty (Cameron, 1992).  
This list can be extended but we argue that one of the main limitations is that 
the TCM focuses on defining a household to have the same utility level as a single 
individual. It assumes that a household acts as an elementary decision making unit 
where all resources are pooled and household decisions are made by a single decision 
maker. In particular, travel cost information is limiting in that it can reveal consumer 
preferences for non-market goods only capturing family behavior, while instead the 
WTP is an individual based measure. The correspondence between WTP estimates 
from the CVM and the TCM is maintained only in the case when considering a 
sample of singles.  
Over the past two decades there has been a growing recognition that this 
approach to the household is inadequate, especially when analyzing decisions made at 
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the household level. (McConnell, 1999; Smith and Van Houtven, 1998 and 2004; 
Dosman and Adamowicz, 2006). If models do not incorporate the preferences of all 
decision makers in the household they will not capture the decision-making structure 
and the bargaining between household members.  
Contingent Valuation Method is hypothetical but it expresses an individual 
WTP. CVM information provides insights into the probable behavior of respondents 
that is individual, personal. In order to make CVM and TCM comparable, what 
should be considered in the Travel Cost Method is not the ‘preferences’ of a given 
household, but rather the preferences of the individuals that compose it.  
We propose therefore that meaningful comparisons between TCM and CVM 
must be undertaken at the individual level. Consequently, in contrast with the existing 
non-market resource valuation literature, our framework does not assume the 
existence of a unique household utility function. Following the basic ideas of the 
collective approach to household behavior by Chiappori (1988, 1992), we assume that 
each individual is characterized by her/his own utility function. 
Several are the contributions of this research to the non-market valuation 
literature. In Chapter 1 we deal with the distinction between individual and 
households in recreational demands model; we overview the literature on the 
collective nature of household decisions; we present the traditional recreational 
demand model and we develop a collective recreational demand model that allows 
identification of individual welfare measures such as consumer surplus for each 
household member by following Browning et al. (2006). This model identifies the 
individual consumer surplus and the allocation of resources within a household by a 
consumption technology function and by using information about the consumption of 
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individuals living alone as if they were living in a household. The consumption 
technology function summarizes all of the technological economies of scale and scope 
that result from living together. In this chapter we test for differences in recreational 
demands between husbands and wives by using cross sectional data from a 
recreational survey. 
In Chapter 2 we develop a ‘Collective Travel Cost Method’ (CTCM). We 
extend the traditional travel cost method to the collective framework proposed by 
Chiappori (1988, 1992). Knowledge of the travel cost to the recreational site of each 
household member allows us to identify the sharing rule between household members 
and to estimate the CTCM. In particular we estimate a Collective Almost Ideal 
Demand System that takes into account the role of each member’s preferences for 
consumption choices and how resources are allocated within the household. We show 
how this method can be applied in order to find individual WTP to access a natural 
park for spouses using revealed preference data. The development and estimation of 
the CTCM allows: (1) to test whether the WTP estimated by the traditional unitary 
TCM is significantly different from the WTP estimated by the CTCM; (2) to test 
whether two spouses have equal or different WTP to access the recreational site, and 
(3) to make TCM and CVM estimates about WTP comparable at the individual level.  
No research exists that estimates the individual WTP for each household 
member by using only revealed preferences data or that applies a Travel Cost Method 
to a collective framework.  
Finally, Chapter 3 deals with one of the most common issues of the 
Contingent Valuation Method: the starting point bias or ‘anchoring’ problem. 
Respondents may ‘anchor’ the value they place on the policy on the bid amounts 
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proposed to them in the initial and/or subsequent payment questions. We examine 
starting point bias in Contingent Valuation surveys with dichotomous choice payment 
questions and follow-ups, and double-bounded models of the WTP responses. We 
investigate (1) the seriousness of the biases for the location and scale parameters of 
WTP in the presence of starting point bias; (2) whether or not these biases depend on 
the distribution of WTP and on the bids used; and (3) how well a commonly used 
diagnostic for starting point bias—a test of the null that bid set dummies entered in 
the right-hand side of the WTP model are jointly equal to zero—performs under 
various circumstances. Because starting point bias cannot be separately identified in 
any reliable manner from biases caused by model specification, we use Monte Carlo 
simulation approaches to address this issue. We find that starting point bias is not so 
much a problem in creating biased WTP estimates while bid design and proper 
specification of the WTP distribution are important in determining unbiased WTP 
estimates. We also find that bid set dummies, which are used by many researchers to 
detect starting point bias, have only very modest power in detecting starting point 
bias. Bid set dummies tend to soak up misspecifications in the distribution assumed 
by the researcher for the latent WTP, rather than capturing the presence of starting 
point bias. 
We conclude with suggestion for future research. The Annex describes the 
survey data used in Chapters 1 and 2. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Individual Versus Household in Recreational Demand Models 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Cost-benefit analysis has to be often undertaken when a change in policy affects the 
quality or the availability of environmental resources. It has been recognised that the 
value of these goods is not explicitly determined through market transactions and it is 
difficult to establish a monetary value for their access because of the absence of 
markets. 
Economists have answered this challenge by developing alternative methods 
of valuing non-market goods. The Travel Cost Method (TCM) by Clawson and 
Knetsch (1966) aggregates visitors to a recreational site into their zones of origin and 
it explains the change in visitors rates from each zone by the travel cost, the income, 
the socio-demographic characteristics of visitors and the characteristics of the 
alternative sites. More research has provided extensions to the original Travel Cost 
Method. Research shows efficiency gains in estimating recreational demand models 
using the observations of individuals themselves rather than traditional zone averages 
(e.g. Brown and Nawas, 1973; Willis and Garrod, 1991). 
We argue that these models treat the term ‘household’ and ‘individual’ as 
synonyms. A household is defined by Becker (1965) as a ‘small factory.’ It consists of 
individuals motivated sometimes by self-interest, other times by altruism and often by 
both, or as if they agree on the best way to combine capital goods, time and home 
production activities. Traditional recreational models focused on defining a household 
as having the same utility level as a single individual, implying that intra-household 
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resource allocation is irrelevant, or that it can be addressed within a dictatorial 
decision process. 
In particular, the traditional Travel Cost Method is limiting in that it can reveal 
consumer preferences for non-market goods by only capturing family behavior. It 
assumes that a household acts as an elementary decision making unit. This approach 
is referred to as ‘unitary.’ However, a household consisting of several members does 
not necessarily behave as a single agent and individuals have utility, not households 
(Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel, 2006).  
In the recreational framework, consider, for example, the case of a married 
couple going to visit a natural park together and the case of an individual living alone 
who goes to visit the natural area. The main question to ask should be, ‘how much is 
an individual living alone willing to pay to attain the same indifference curve over 
goods as an individual attains, for those goods, as a member of the household?’ 
The utility of this study can be derived from the observation that within 
households choices are affected by the presence of other household members. In 
addition, usually only the household’s total purchases are observed in recreational 
surveys and not their distribution and use among members. Thus we have to identify 
the individual’s preferences and since the distribution of resources within the 
household is not usually recorded, it has to be identified from the aggregate household 
demand. In order to identify the individual preferences we can use either information 
on exclusive goods consumption by individuals living in the same households 
(Chiappori 1988’s approach), or information about the consumption of individuals 
living alone as if they were living in the family (Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel, 
2006’s approach). Note that from this point we will refer to them as BCL. 
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Still, a comprehensive study of a collective model applied to recreational 
demand models does not exist. This study proposes a novel approach to estimating a 
collective recreational demand model that accounts for intra-household resource 
allocation. The technique is based on an analogy borrowed from the literature of 
collective household behavior and, in particular, on the BCL’ model. Thanks to the 
BCL model, combining data from households and from people living alone and by a 
consumption technology function, we can completely identify the sharing rule that 
expresses the bargaining power between household members and the consumer 
surplus for each household member. The consumption technology function 
summarizes all of the technological economies of scale and scope that result from 
living together.  
Finally, we test for differences in recreational demands between husbands and 
wives by using cross sectional data from a recreational survey. We find that husbands 
and wives have significantly different recreational demands. This implies that 
observations for husbands and wives may not be treated as identical as in the 
traditional recreational demand model (unless one spouse is the dictator). We also 
found that in absolute value the consumer surplus estimate derived from the 
traditional unitary recreational model appears to overestimate the consumer surplus of 
husbands and underestimate the consumer surplus of wives, and that wives have 
significantly higher consumer surplus than husbands for access at the West Garda 
Regional Forest.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 presents an 
overview of the literature on individual versus household in non-market valuation and 
the collective nature of household decisions. Section 1.3 outlines the BCL model’s 
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basic structure; it presents the traditional recreational demand model and it derives our 
extension of the BCL model to the recreational demand model. Section 1.4 provides 
some evidence of significant differences in recreational demand and consumer surplus 
between husbands and wives. The last section summarizes and discusses the welfare 
implications of the framework for collective household model with suggestions for 
future research. 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
It is by now accepted that the distinction between individual and household in 
recreational models matters. In the context of Contingent Valuation, Quiggin (1998) 
considers whether the Willingness-To-Pay (WTP) for the benefit generated by a 
public good should be elicited on an individual or a household level. He finds that 
there may be some differences between individual and household WTP when 
household members are mutually altruistic. Munro (2005) shows that the household 
and the individual WTP are equal if and only if the household pools income. 
Other authors (e.g. Haab and McConnell, 2002; Bockstael and McConnell, 
2006) recognize that they ignore the distinction between household and individual in 
their work. In particular Bockstael and McConnell (2006) note that ‘the distinction 
between the individual and the household is a difficult one for which there is, to date, 
no adequate treatment. In the original paper on household production, Becker treated 
the household as the decision making unit, suggesting that intra-household allocations 
of consumption and production activities would be made ‘optimally’ (p.512). In the 
forty years since that paper, little progress has been made in explaining this intra-
household allocation process or in reconciling the distinction between the household 
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as decision maker and the individual members as consumers. We continue to use the 
terms individual and household interchangeably, but recognize that embedded in their 
distinction are potentially important considerations’ (p. 8, Chapter 4). 
Smith (1988) compares five methods for estimating travel cost recreation 
demand models with microdata and argues that a component of research strategy 
should involve ‘systematic effort at understanding how individuals make their 
recreation choices and whether these are adequately described by any of these 
models’ (p.35).  
In the framework of revealed preferences, the only papers that we could find 
specifically addressing these issues are McConnell (1999), Smith and Van Houtven 
(1998, 2004) and Dosman and Adamowicz (2006). 
McConnell (1999) states that the fact that many studies do not distinguish 
between individual and household makes the empirical estimates ambiguous. Further, 
‘economists need to think carefully about the individual versus the household in 
designing surveys and in measuring welfare’ (p. 466). He attempts to address this 
issue by developing a recreational model based on two individuals (spouses) sharing 
income, household production and earning different wages. The limit in this approach 
is that the basic structure of the model is the unitary model that assumes income 
pooling, that a household has a single utility function and that there is not bargaining 
and intra-household allocation of resources between household members. 
Dosman and Adamowicz (2006) examine the choice of two spouses for a 
vacation site. They investigate intra-household bargaining using stated and revealed 
preference data. They overcome the problem that individual preferences for the site 
are not observed by using stated preference methods. They ask each partner to make 
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choices in a stated preference experiment and they use these choices to develop 
estimates of the spouses’ preference parameters. Then they construct a bargaining 
model where the household utility is defined as the weighted average utility of 
partners’ preferences. Since the household decision about the vacation site is 
observed, they estimate the bargaining parameter as the value that provides the best fit 
between the actual household choice and the weighted utility. They find that the 
probability that the household will choose the husband’s favorite vacation site is 
decreasing as the husband’s income is increasing. While the wife’s power for the 
vacation site decision is increasing as the partner’s income is increasing. An 
explanation of this result is that the opportunity cost of time for the husband is higher 
and he spends less time in planning the vacation.  
Smith and Van Houtven (1998, 2004) focus on the collective model by 
Chiappori (1988, 1992). They extend Chiappori’s model for recovering Hicksian 
welfare measures. They describe how it affects non-market valuation of price and 
quality changes but they do not provide any empirical application. 
Chiappori (1988) proposes the first collective model, which is a static labor 
supply model. This model assumes that the objective function of the household is the 
weighted sum of the utility functions for each member’s preferences. The weights 
represent the bargaining power of the household members in the intrahousehold 
allocation process. The rule that determines the sharing of total expenditure on private 
goods within the household is defined as ‘sharing rule’. The bargaining power is 
affected by exogenous variables, such as wages and non-labor income, and by other 
variables called ‘distribution factors’ (Browning et al., 1994), which influence the 
decision process without affecting either the utility function or the budget constraint. 
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Examples of distribution factors are tax laws that differ according to marital status 
and divorce law. Changes in these variables may effect outside opportunities of the 
household members and may have consequences in their bargaining power within the 
household. An increase in an individual’s non-labor income may shift bargaining 
power from one individual to the other and this affects the allocation of household 
consumption and labor supply (see Vermeulen, 2002 and Browning, Chiappori and 
Lechene, 2006 for a detailed overview of collective models). 
In Chiappori’s model and consequently in Smith and Van Houtven (1998, 
2004)’s approach the sharing rule is identified up to a constant and it is estimated by 
using information on two exclusive goods privately consumed. Smith and Van 
Houtven consider the case of a two-member household where each individual 
consumes two private goods and in addition each person consumes one of these goods 
exclusively, for example sport fishing and swimming in the ocean. Finally, both 
members consume a third private good. They analyze the case where one member 
engages in a specific recreational activity affected by a change in environmental 
quality, and the other member does not. The authors do not investigate the case where 
both household members are affected by the change in environmental quality. They 
point out that it is still possible to recover individual preferences but that the problem 
is more complicated. 
Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2006) propose an alternative approach that 
does not use consumption of exclusive goods but household’s consumption aggregate 
data of singles and couples. BCL show how to completely identify joint consumption 
and the allocation of resources within a household by a consumption technology 
function and the sharing rule. ‘The idea of the consumption technology function is 
 15
that features of household consumption such as economies of scale or scope, joint use 
of resources, etc., can be defined as a technology that describes the set of options for 
the joint consumption of goods that are available to household members’ (BCL, p.5). 
BCL’s framework is similar to Becker (1965) model, except that instead of using 
market goods to produce commodities that contribute to utility, the household 
produces the equivalent of a greater quantity of market goods via sharing (BCL).  
BCL emphasize that they assume that individual’s preferences for goods do 
not change when they marry but that this does not mean that once married individuals 
consume the same bundles as singles because of the economies of scales and scope in 
consumption in a couple. This assumption also does not exclude that individuals can 
get utility from marriage. What it implies is that the indifference curves of single men 
or women living alone are the same as the indifference curves associated with the 
utility functions of the individuals in a couple (BCL). If this assumption holds, then 
the demand functions of household members can be estimated directly by observing 
the consumption behavior of single men and women. However, BCL also show how 
to overcome the assumption that tastes do not change. First, they identify the demand 
functions for singles, then they parameterize how preferences change because of 
marriage and finally, they use couple’s data to estimate the parameters of the change 
in preferences, the consumption technology and the sharing rule. 
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1.3 Models 
 
1.3.1 The Benchmark Model: Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2006)’s Model 
In this section we present BCL (2006)’s model of household behavior as the 
benchmark model that we use to develop a collective recreational demand model. 
BCL consider two cases: when the individual is living alone (‘single’) and when the 
individual is a household member (‘couple’). This allows them to use the demand data 
of people living alone to identify individual preferences and to use household data to 
identify the consumption technology and the sharing rule. 
When the individual i is living alone the optimisation problem is 
Max Ui(zi) subject to yi = pzi  (1.1) 
where the utility function Ui is monotonically increasing, continuously twice 
differentiable and strictly quasi-concave; yi is the exogenous income of individual i; p 
is the vector of prices of the goods zi . The solution is the vector of Marshallian 
demands zim(p / yi). The corresponding indirect utility function is defined as 
V i(p / yi) = Ui(zim (p / yi))  (1.2) 
Then, BCL consider the case where individual i is member of a household that 
consists of a couple living together (i = f or m). The couple’s utility maximization 
problem is  
Max U[Uf(xf), Um(xm), p / y] subject to x = (xf + xm), z = F(x), p’z ≤ y (1.3) 
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where z is the vector of inputs that the couple purchases; x, xf and xm are the 
quantities of the goods z respectively consumed by the household and privately by 
each household member; p is the vector of market prices; y is the household total 
income and F is the consumption technology function. The transformation from z to x 
embodied by the function F is intended to summarize all of the technological 
economies of scale and scope that result from living together. Consider the example 
of BCL (p. 10): ‘Let good j be automobile use, measured by distance travelled (or 
some consumed good that is proportional to distance, perhaps gasoline). If xjf and xjm 
are the distances travelled by car by each household member, then the total distance 
the car travels is zj = (xjf + xjm) / (1 + r) where r is the fraction of distance that the 
couple rides together. This yields a consumption technology function for automobile 
use of z = x / (1 + r).’ 
Note that this framework is similar to a Becker (1965) type household 
production model but with the following main difference: the production function 
combines the inputs and generates the output, while the consumption technology 
function transforms the output x, that is what the individuals consume, into the inputs 
z that are purchased by the individuals. Thus F(x) can be interpreted as an inverse 
production function4. 
Further, note that U is a twice differentiable utility function that can be 
interpreted as ‘a social welfare function for the household’, in which each household 
member has different bargaining power. In BCL the bargaining function U depends 
                                                 
4 As BCL note, we can have more complicated consumption technologies. For example, ‘the fraction of 
time r that the couple shares the car could depend on the total usage, resulting in F being a nonlinear 
function of xj. There could also be economies (or diseconomies) of scope as well as scale in the 
consumption technology, e.g., the shared travel time percentage r could be related to expenditures on 
vacations, resulting in F(x) being a function of other elements of x in addition to xj’ (p. 11). 
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on the relative incomes of the household members, and each household member’s 
utility Ui also depends on demographic characteristics. Following Chiappori (1988, 
1992), the utility function U can be written as the weighted sum of the utility 
functions for each member’s preferences 
U[Uf(xf), Um(xm), p / y]  = μ( p / y) Uf(xf) + Um(xm), (1.4) 
where the weight μ represents the bargaining power of the household members in 
the intrahousehold allocation process. Individual m receives a weight of one and 
individual f a weight of μ in determining the intrahousehold decisions. The larger μ 
is the larger the bargaining power of member f and therefore the larger the 
quantities xf consumed by member f with respect to the quantities consumed by 
member m. As BCL note, one limit using μ is that it will depend ‘on the arbitrary 
cardinalizations of functions Uf and Um’. The interesting contribution of BCL that 
distinguishes their work from Chiappori (1988, 1992) is the introduction of ‘the 
sharing rule’ ϕ, which ‘does not depend upon any cardinalization.’ The sharing 
rule describes the allocation of resources among household members. BCL specify 
the sharing rule as a function of distributional variables d that affect the bargaining 
power, such as the wife’s share of total gross income, the difference in age between 
husband and wife, or the log household total expenditure deflated by a Stone price 
index. Note that instead the approach followed by Chiappori (1988, 1992) 
identifies the sharing rule up to a constant.  
The BCL’s model for ϕ follows the logistic form  
ϕ = exp(d’γ) / [1 + exp(d’γ)]  with 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1  (1.5) 
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where d is a vector of distributional variables and φ is a vector of parameters. 
The household’s behavior is equivalent to allocating the fraction of shadow 
income ϕf = ϕ to member f, and the fraction of shadow income ϕm = (1 – ϕ) to 
member m. 
Each member i maximizes their own utility function Ui(xi) subject to the 
budget constraint ϕi = π’xi. The maximization problem for each household member is 
Max Ui(xi) subject to ϕi = π’xi  (1.6) 
where π is the shadow price vector for the individual i’s private good xi and ηi is the 
individual i’s shadow income. BCL show that by homogeneity the price vector π can 
be normalized such that π’x = 1, ϕ = ϕf = π’xf and ϕm = (1 – ϕ). The sharing rule is 
the fraction of the household’s shadow income that is allocated to member f. Note that 
the household purchases the vector z = F(xf + xm). 
For simplicity BCL assume a Barten type technology function5, defined as z = 
Rx, equivalent to the linear technology z = Rx + a when the matrix R is diagonal and 
a is a vector of zeros. In this case the constraint p’z = y becomes p’(Rx) = y. Since 
π’x = 1, the shadow prices for this technology are 
π = R’p / y ,  (1.7) 
where the couple faces market price p and total income y.  
                                                 
5 Barten type technology function (1964) is a special case of Gorman’s (1976) general linear 
technology model z = Rx + a, with R diagonal and a zero (see also Muellbauer, 1977; Perali, 2003). 
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The second welfare theorem implies that the individual, facing price π and 
income ηi, will choose the bundle xi. The solution to the utility maximization problem 
is a set of Marshallian demands equal to 
 1( ( / ) / ( / ))  
( / )
y y
y y
ϕ ϕ
⎛= ⎜⎝ ⎠
i i
m m
R'px π p p x
p
⎞⎟ , (1.8) 
which yields the indirect utility function Vi (π / ϕ)6. 
Then, since π = R’p / y, the household actually purchases the vector z that 
becomes 
 1  1     
 ( / )  1 ( / )y y y yϕ ϕ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛= +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ −⎝ ⎠ ⎝
f m
m m
R'p R'pz Rx Rx
p p
⎞⎟⎠
)
 (1.9) 
The relationship between the weight µ and the sharing rule ϕ can be written as 
( )( )
( )(
/ /
/1 /
f
m
V
V
ϕ ϕμ ϕ ϕ
∂ ∂= − ∂ − ∂
π
π
 (1.10) 
where Vi is the indirect utility function of member i (see BCL p. 13 for a formal 
proof). 
Note that one advantage of BCL model respect Chiappori (1988, 1992)’s model is that 
using data from households and from singles living alone, the sharing rule is 
completly identified. BCL empirically estimate simultaneously a joint system 
consisting of a vector of budget shares for singles and a vector of budget shares for 
couples. They can do so because all the parameters in the singles model appear in the 
                                                 
6 Note that π(.) and ϕ(.) are functions and p/y is their argument. 
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couples model. They use the demand data of people living alone to identify individual 
preferences, thereby leaving the job of identifying the consumption technology and 
the sharing rule to household data. 
 
1.3.2 Traditional Recreational Demand Model 
In the traditional literature of recreational demand the terms ‘individual’ and 
‘household’ are used interchangeably. Traditional analysis models the household as it 
was a single individual. The allocation of the resources among its members is ignored. 
Following Bockstael and McConnell (2006), individuals maximize utility U 
which is a function of the number of trips (n) taken to a site7, environmental quality at 
the site (q) and a composite commodity (b). The number of trips is produced using 
inputs s such as gasoline, food and lodging. First, note that the number of trips is a 
weak complement with the environmental quality: q does not affect the individual’s 
utility if she does not go to the site (n = 0); second, note that some of the goods that 
compose the vector s are exclusive for the individual (for example sunscreen lotion 
for women and fishing equipment for men) and others are consumed and shared 
between members of the trip (for example gasoline and food), but for the moment, 
following the traditional literature, we assume that each individual that shares these 
goods consumes the same amount of them. 
Then, consider the time constraint that limits the amount of time that can be 
spent on leisure activities. As Bockstael and McConnell (2006) emphasize, not 
considering the time cost term in the demand function would produce a biased 
                                                 
7 For simplicity we consider trips on a single site. 
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estimated cost coefficient that leads to an underestimate of the consumer surplus for 
access to the site. Then, the individual’s optimisation problem is 
Max U(n, b; q) subject to y + wL ≥ ps + b , T ≥ L + t n and g(n, s) = 0 (1.11) 
where y is exogenous non-wage income, w is the after-tax wage rate, L is the total 
number of hours spent working, p is the vector of prices of the inputs s, T is the total 
available time to the individual, t is the time cost of access to the recreational site, b is 
the price of the composite commodity normalized to 1 and g(n, s) is the household 
production technology. As Bockstael and McConnell note, g(n, s) implies a cost 
function that is the solution of the cost minimization problem 
C(n, p) = mins{ps | g(n, s) = 0} (1.12) 
and if the cost function is linear in n than the marginal cost per trip equals the average 
cost per trip c(p). The maximization problem becomes 
Max U(n, b; q) subject to y + wL ≥ c(p)n + b and T ≥ L + t n . (1.13) 
Since we assume that the individual can choose how to allocate his time 
between work (L) and leisure (t) the two constraints can be combined into one: 
Max U(n, b; q) subject to [y + wT – n(c(p) + wt) – b] ≥ 0 ,  (1.14) 
which leads to the Marshallian demand nm(c, q, w, T, y). 
In the traditional Travel Cost Method (TCM) the value of the site, which can be 
interpreted as the Willingness-To-Pay of the individual to access to the site, is derived 
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by calculating the individual’s consumer surplus (CS). The individual’s consumer 
surplus is the area behind the Marshallian demand for trips to the site 
0
0
( ,  , , , )
ç
mc
CS n c q w T y dc= ∫  ,  (1.15) 
where c0 is the observed level of constant marginal cost to produce trips n and ç is the 
choke price of the trip: nm(ç) = 0. 
Further, to be useful for policy purposes, the estimated consumer surplus can 
be aggregated across the population of recreational users. The total economic value of 
the site can be estimated as the sum of the consumer surplus of each individual going 
to the site: 
0 ,
0( ,  , , , )
i
i
çK
im i i ii c
CS n c q w T y dc∑= ∫   (1.16) 
where K is the total number of site users. 
 
1.3.3 Collective Recreational Demand Model 
In this section, we develop a collective recreational demand model applying the 
collective model of household behavior of BCL (2006) to the traditional recreational 
demand model described in the previous section.  
Since we are considering individuals living together their individual choice is 
conditioned by the presence of the other members. This is a more complicated case 
than BCL’s case. We have to consider not only the consumption technology function 
but also the household production function. The consumption technology function 
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transforms what the individuals privately consume (for example number of trips taken 
to a site by member m and f) into the inputs that the couple is observed purchasing 
(for example number of trips taken to a site by the household). The household 
production function combines inputs, such as food and gasoline, to generate the 
output ‘trips’. 
Another issue is related to the time cost of the recreational trip. ‘Time’ raises 
two problems8. First, it is easier to pool money than to pool time in a household. For 
instance, the husband could spend his wife’s money if he wants, but it is much harder 
for him to spend his wife’s time to go to a recreational site9. Second, the time costs 
are not shared in the same way as money costs. Suppose a couple takes some joint 
recreational trips. The money costs are shared, for example the couple benefits from 
the same gasoline purchase. However the time costs are not shared in the same way. If 
both husband and wife take the trip, then both husband and wife’s time costs must be 
charged. This problem makes the recreational demand model different from the 
BCL’s model. 
First, we analyze the case of individuals living alone, and then the case of 
individuals living together. In fact, BCL use the demand data of people living alone to 
identify the Marshallian demand functions xim arising from the utility functions Ui, 
and the household data to estimate the household’s demand functions z, the 
consumption technology F and the sharing rule ϕ.10
 
                                                 
8 The author thanks Nancy Bockstael for having pointed out these problems. 
9 Note that pooling time is possible when household members reallocate household tasks. For example, 
the husband has more time for fishing if the wife cleans and cooks the fish. 
10 BCL’s model assumes that marriage does not induce preference changes. They justify this 
assumption claiming that ‘it may be reasonable to assume that, at least for some goods, the dollar effect 
of a change in tastes is small.’ In the recreational case we could assume that preferences of singles are 
not significantly different from those of married people if there are not children in the household.  
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1.3.3.1  Individuals Living Alone 
We apply the traditional recreational demand model described in Section 1.3.2 
because we consider individuals living alone, thus, there is not intra-household 
allocation of resources and no shared travel costs or problems with pooling time. 
The utility optimisation problem of individual i is similar to that of the 
traditional recreational demand model, however there are two differences. The first 
difference is in the notation. Each variable and the utility function of individual i are 
characterized by the superscript i: if i = f we refer to a woman; if i = m to a man. The 
second difference consists of replacing the implicit production function g(ni, si) = 0 
with ni = B(si), where B is the transformation (production) function from inputs into 
the production of trips. 
It is made explicit that the exogenous income (yi), the number of trips to a 
recreational site (ni), the composite commodity (bi), the time costs of access to the 
recreational site (ti), the after-tax wage rate wi, the total number of hours spent 
working (Li) and the vector of inputs used (si) refer to the site’s user i and not to the 
household as a single decision making unit. 
Following the methodology presented in Section 1.3.2, we can derive the 
individual recreational demands for the recreational site, nfm(cf, q, wf, T, yf) and 
nmm(cm, q, wm, T, ym), where ci is the constant cost per trip derived assuming marginal 
cost equal to average cost, and thus, we can obtain the usual welfare measures of the 
traditional recreational demand literature (compensating variation and consumer 
surplus). Note that in this case, these measures refer to the welfare of an individual 
that lives alone. 
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1.3.3.2 Individuals Living Together 
Now, consider the case of two individuals living together, (i = m and f), who can take 
trips separately as well as jointly.11
As we pointed out at the beginning of Section 1.3.3, in this case travel costs 
will be shared if the two individuals take a trip jointly while the time costs are not 
shared. We deal with this problem expanding BCL’s model by including time 
constraints on each individual in the household’s maximization problem. We evaluate 
time at different wage rates because we assume that the household members have 
different jobs. Further, as in the traditional recreational demand model, the household 
production technology is such that trips are produced using inputs s (for example 
gasoline and lodging), and we assume that the travel cost function is linear in the 
number of trips. This implies that the marginal travel cost per trip equals the average 
travel cost per trip c(p). 
The household’s optimisation problem becomes 
Max U[Uf(nf, b; q), Um(nm, b; q)] = μ Uf(nf, b; q) + Um(nm, b; q),  (1.17) 
subject to 
N = nf + nm,    (1.18) 
Z = F(N),    (1.19) 
y + w fL f + wmLm ≥ c(p)Z + b, (1.20) 
T ≥ Lf + tf nf    (1.21) 
                                                 
11 We anticipate here that the behavior of a group is assumed equal to the behavior of a family, 
recognizing that important considerations are embedded in this distinction. 
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T ≥ Lm + tmnm  (1.22) 
where the weight μ represents the bargaining power of the household members in the 
intra-household allocation process: individual m receives a weight of one, and 
individual f receives a weight of μ in determining the intra-household decisions; U is 
a twice differentiable utility function ‘interpreted as a social welfare function for the 
household’; Ui is the utility of member i12; p is the vector of prices for the inputs s; y 
the household total income; b is the price of the composite commodity normalized to 
1; tf and tm are the time costs of each household member; Lf and Lm are the total 
number of hours spent working by individuals f and m; wf and wm are the after-tax 
wage rate of each household member; Z is the number of trips the couple is taking to a 
site accounting for the fact that some trips are taken jointly; nf and nm are the number 
of trips taken by each household member; N is the total number of trips taken by both 
household members; F is the consumption technology function that summarizes the 
economies of scale that arise from traveling together and sharing13. 
We allow the two time constraints for the two household members to be 
collapsed in the budget constraint. 
The household’s optimisation problem becomes 
Max U[Uf(nf, b; q), Um(nm, b; q)] = μ Uf(nf, b; q) + Um(nm, b; q),  (1.23) 
subject to 
                                                 
12 We assume that the utility functions of children are jointed with the utility of the household member 
f, living for future research the investigation of a model that relaxes this assumption. 
13 The consumption technology may also capture some kinds of taste that result from traveling together 
rather than traveling alone. 
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N = nf + nm,   
Z = F(N),   
y + (w f + wm)T ≥ c(p)Z + (w ft fnf + wm t mnm) + b.  (1.24) 
Note that empirically we observe the total household income and not the 
individual income. The household’s behavior is equivalent to allocating the fraction of 
shadow (not observed) income ϕf = ϕ  to member f, and the fraction ϕm = 1 – ϕ  to 
member m, where ϕ is defined in equation (1.5). Each household member i maximizes 
their own utility function Ui subject to the budget constraint ϕi = πini, where πi is the 
shadow price vector for the own number of trips ni and ϕi is the individual i’s shadow 
income. 
The household purchases trips Z = F(nf + nm) and for simplicity BCL assume 
a Barten type technology function, defined as Z = RN, where N = nf + nm.14
The budget constraint (1.24) becomes 
nf[c(p)R + w ft f] + nm[c(p)R + w mt m] + b = y + T(w f + wm) (1.25), 
which yields to the shadow prices of individual i’s trips 
( )     
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m m
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f m
c R w t
y T w w
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p   (1.26) 
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( )     
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c R w t
y T w w
π += + +
p ,  (1.27) 
                                                 
14 R can be thought as a scale factor when trips are taken jointly. 
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where the couple faces constant cost per trip c(p) and total income y. Note that the 
shadow prices of individual i’s trips depend on the time costs of both individuals, not 
only on the time cost of individual i. 
By the second welfare theorem, the solution to the utility maximization 
problem is a set of Marshallian demands equal to nim (πi / ϕ i) and the indirect utility 
function is Vi (πi / ϕ i), which depend on the shadow prices and the sharing rule. This 
implies that the recreational demand of individual i depends not only on individual i’s 
time cost but also on the time cost of the other household member. 
Then Z becomes 
( )  1  
( )  
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m m
m
f m
f f
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 (1.28) 
Note that the knowledge of the sharing rule ϕ permits the derivation of 
individual indirect utility and cost functions that can be used to perform both 
interpersonal and inter-household comparisons. 
Finally, following the traditional recreational literature and applying equation 
(1.15) we can calculate the consumer surplus for each household member and for the 
household, taking into account the intra-household allocation of resources and that 
each individual has their own preferences. 
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1.4 Some Empirical Analysis 
 
1.4.1 Study Site and Data Gathering 
The sample is drawn from an onsite survey conducted by the Department of 
Economics of the University of Verona on the West side of Garda Lake in the 
Northeast of Italy from June to October 1997. This survey was part of an integrated 
analysis on the multi-functionality of the West Garda Regional Forest in order to 
define cooperative policies between institutions, local operators and visitors.15
This area was picked because the trips taken would mostly be single-
destination, single-purpose trips, which is a necessary assumption of the Travel Cost 
Method (TCM) (Freeman, 1993). It was also felt that, due to Garda Lake’s popularity 
with tourists from throughout the country and abroad, there would be sufficient 
variation in distance travelled, time and trip cost. 
Each respondent was asked to recall the number of annual trips made to the 
West Garda Regional Forest and the number of trips to other natural areas during the 
year. In order to double check the declared costs, visitors were asked to specify their 
place of residence, the distance travelled between the natural area and their residence, 
the journey time and for those who were on vacation, the distance from the forest to 
their vacation lodging. 
Moreover, the following data were collected for each individual: means of 
transportation used, number of passengers per means of transportation, how many 
family members and how many shared the expense of the trip; if stops were made at 
other places before going to the natural area; how many days the trip lasted; 
                                                 
15 For a detailed description of the survey see the Annex. 
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individual and family transportation expenditure to go to the forest; individual and 
family expenditure in food, lodging and free time activities during the trip; occupation 
and weekly number of hours of work. We used this information to construct the 
variable ‘travel cost’, which comprehends the opportunity cost of time spent traveling 
to the natural area.16
In order to estimate the expenditure on alternative sites, the visitor was asked 
about the distance from the residence, the number of visits to each site, the quality of 
the area and the purpose of the trip. 
This survey also has an advantage in allowing us to know if the visitors are 
married, and then if the visitor is the husband or the wife.17
The visitor was also asked how she allocated her time during the visit between 
naturalistic (for example going sightseeing), harvesting (for example harvesting 
flowers, mushrooms, hunting and fishing) and recreational activities (for example 
mountain biking, horse riding, hiking, picnicking, visiting historic places), and how 
she would have wished to spend her time between these activities. Figure 1.1 shows 
the percentage of on site time spent in different activities for husbands and wives. 
Husbands bike and visit more than wives do, but they hike and sightsee less than 
wives do. 
 
                                                 
16 Several studies apply and compare different values to estimate the opportunity cost of time (for 
example Cesario, 1976; McConnell and Strand, 1981; Johnson, 1983; Smith et al., 1983; Chavas et al., 
1989; Bockstael et al., 1990; McKean et al., 1996). In this study we evaluate travel time at one third of 
the wage rate (Cesario, 1976). 
17 Note that only one respondent was interviewed in each household so ‘husband’ and ‘wife’ are not in 
the same couple. 
 32
 Figure 1.1 – Percentage of on Site Time Spent in Different Activities 
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1.4.2 Empirical Model and Results 
In this study we do not estimate the collective recreational demand model developed 
in Section 1.3.3 but first we test the null hypothesis that, after controlling for income 
and other socio-economic characteristics, the recreational demand of husbands is not 
statistically different from the recreational demand of wives. Testing for this 
hypothesis allows us to motivate future research in the estimation of the collective 
recreational demand model. If the recreational demand of husbands and wives are the 
same then husband and wife responses may be treated identically, as in the traditional 
unitary recreational demand model. Second, we test the null hypothesis of no 
difference in consumer surplus between husbands and wives, and third we test that the 
 33
consumer surplus estimated using the traditional recreational demand model is not 
statistically different from the consumer surplus estimates of husbands and wives.18  
In order to test these hypotheses we consider the sample of husbands and 
wives (225 observations) and we estimate an unrestricted Poisson model where we 
allow the parameters of the model to vary by gender. Table 1.1 defines the variables 
used in the Poisson model and Table 1.2 presents summary statistics for husbands and 
wives. 
 
Table 1.1 - Definition of the Variables in the Poisson Model 
Variable Definition 
trips Annual number of visits to the natural area 
ln_income Log(annual income/1000) in euros 
tc Travel cost per car in euros 
ln_tc1 Log(annual travel cost per car for visits to 1st alternative site) in euros 
ln_tc2 Log(annual travel cost per car for visits to 2nd alternative site) in euros 
edu Number of years of education 
age Age 
Obs. Number of Observations 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 It would have been also interesting to compare the recreational demand and the consumer surplus of 
single men and women with those of husbands and wives with and without children but unfortunately 
the small sample size does not allow us this kind of estimation. We suggest implementing this 
comparison as future research. 
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Table 1.2 - Descriptive Statistics for Selected Variables in the Poisson Model 
  Pooled sample Husbands Wives 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
trips 7.098 12.064 8.317 14.240 5.128 6.926 
ln_income 3.091 0.495 3.115 0.497 3.052 0.492 
tc 3.927 7.196 4.276 7.334 3.364 6.973 
ln_tc1 2.137 2.048 2.126 2.051 2.154 2.054 
ln_tc2 0.915 1.700 0.932 1.714 0.889 1.685 
edu 12.342 4.241 12.647 4.283 11.849 4.149 
age 44.418 11.330 45.237 11.704 43.093 10.630 
Obs. 225 139   86 
 
Let X be the vector of independent variables: the logarithm of the individual 
i’s monthly net income from the previous year (ln_income), the travel cost per car to 
visit the natural area (tc), the logarithm of the annual travel cost per car to visit two 
alternative sites that are different from the West Garda Regional Forest (ln_tc1, 
ln_tc2), education (edu), and age (age). 
We allow for differences in recreational demand between husbands and wives 
by interacting the X vector with the dummy variable for sex (sex = 1 if male, 0 if 
female). 
The general form for the recreational demand for the natural area becomes 
* ( ) exp( ' ' )itrips E trips sex= = + ⋅X α X β   (1.29) 
where tripsi is the annual number of visits to the natural area by individual 
 and trips* is the expected number of trips. {1 }i = ,..., K
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The α parameters correspond to the coefficients for the X variables for wives. 
The β parameters represent the difference between husbands and wives.  
If the null hypothesis of no significant differences between husbands and 
wives is not rejected then the unrestricted model (model A in Table 1.3) becomes the 
same as the restricted traditional Poisson model (model B in Table 1.3). To test this 
hypothesis we specify the null as H0: β = 0 (i.e. ‘husbands’ = ‘wives’) and the 
alternative as H1: at least one coefficient of the vector of parameters β is significantly 
different from zero.  
Table 1.3 shows the parameter estimates for the unrestricted and restricted 
model. As expected the number of visits to the natural area decreases if the travel cost 
(tc) increases (tc has a negative sign and is significant at the 1% statistical level) and 
if income increases then the number of trips increases (ln_income has a positive sign 
and is significant at the 1% statistical level). However that the coefficient on 
education (edu) is negative is opposite of our expectations.  
We use the unrestricted model to perform a Wald test of the null hypothesis 
H0: β = 0 of no differences between husbands and wives. We reject the null at the 1% 
significant level19. We also perform the likelihood ratio test using the unrestricted and 
restricted models and we again reject the null hypotheses of no difference in the 
recreational demand between husbands and wives at the 1% significant level.20 
Rejection of the null hypothesis suggests that observations for husbands and wives 
                                                 
19 The χ2 statistic is 195.01 for H0: β = 0 (p-value 0.000). The critical value of the χ2 statistic with 6 
degrees of freedom is 16.81 at the 1% confidence level. 
20 The χ2 statistic is 203.34 (p-value 0.000). The critical value of the χ2 statistic with 6 degrees of 
freedom is 16.81 at the 1% confidence level. 
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may not be treated as identical as in the traditional recreational demand model (unless 
one spouse is the dictator).  
Table 1.3 – Poisson Estimates of Restricted and Unrestricted Models 
 
Model A 
(Restricted) 
Model B 
(Unrestricted) 
Variable Coef. Std. Err.   Coef. Std. Err.   
    α parameters 
constant 0.751 0.213 *** 0.933 0.218 *** 
ln_income 0.491 0.060 *** 0.569 0.095 *** 
tc -0.010 0.001 *** -0.003 0.001 *** 
ln_tc1 0.073 0.015 *** 0.024 0.028  
ln_tc2 -0.014 0.016   0.089 0.031 *** 
edu -0.017 0.007 ** -0.064 0.013 *** 
age 0.003 0.002   -0.007 0.004  
  β parameters 
ln_income*sex    -0.059 0.098  
tc*sex     -0.013 0.001 *** 
ln_tc1*sex     0.068 0.033 ** 
ln_tc2*sex     -0.143 0.037 *** 
edu*sex     0.056 0.015 *** 
age*sex     0.009 0.005 ** 
Log likelihood -1464.111 -1362.4418 
Sample Size 225 225 
*** Significance at the 1% level; ** Significance at the 5% level; 
* Significance at the 10% level. 
 
Finally, we want to test the null hypotheses of (i) no significant difference in 
the consumer surplus estimates of husbands and wives, and (ii) of no significant 
difference between the consumer surplus estimates of husbands and wives and the 
consumer surplus obtained using the traditional restricted model (i.e. model A). 
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The unrestricted Poisson model just described can be used to calculate the 
consumer surplus of husbands and wives by taking the area under the expected 
demand function (1.29). For the exponential demand function (1.29), the choke price, 
at which the demand of trips is zero, is infinite (Habb and McConnell, 2002, p. 167). 
Let us consider the simple demand specification trips* = exp(δ0 + δ1 tc), the consumer 
surplus for access to the forest is 
0
*
0
0 1 1
1
exp( ) when 0tripsCS tc dtcδ δ δδ
∞
= + = −∫
tc
<
0
  (1.30) 
where  is the expected number of trips at the current travel cost 
tc
*
0 0 1exp( )trips tcδ δ= +
0 and δ1 is the coefficient on tc0. Then, the consumer surplus per trip can be 
calculated as -1 / δ1 (Creel and Loomis, 1990). 
We obtain the mean consumer surplus per trip estimates for husbands and 
wives by substituting the estimated coefficients from the unrestricted model from 
Table 1.3.21 These results, along with their standard errors estimated by bootstrapping 
for 1000 replications, are shown in Table 1.4.22  
Table 1.4 – Mean Consumer Surplus (CS) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 95% Conf. Interval 
Traditional CS 225 6.280 0.196 2.945 5.893 6.667 
Husbands’ CS 139 4.503 0.223 2.634 4.061 4.945 
Wives’ CS 86 16.058 0.641 5.944 14.784 17.333 
 
                                                 
21 From Table 1.3 (model B) we have that wives’δ1 corresponds to αtc, = -0.003, while husbands’δ1 =  
αtc + βtc = -0.003 + (-0.013) = - 0.016.  
22 Note that the CS figures in Table 1.4 have been divided by the number of passengers in the car and 
by the number of days of the visit at the site, so they refer to the CS per day of trip and per passenger. 
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In absolute value, the consumer surplus estimate derived from the restricted 
traditional model appears to overestimate the consumer surplus of husbands and 
underestimate the consumer surplus of wives. The difference is statistically significant 
at the 1% level.23 We also reject the null hypothesis of no difference in consumer 
surplus between husbands and wives at the 1% level24: wives have significantly 
higher consumer surplus than husbands for access at the West Garda Regional Forest. 
 
1.5 Conclusions and Discussion 
The main contribution of this study to the recreational models literature is 
conceptual: we demonstrate that a utility theoretic framework derived from the 
collective model proposed by Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2006) can be used to 
formulate a collective recreational demand model. This model allows the researcher to 
find the consumer surplus for each household member and for the household. It takes 
into account the intra-household allocation of resources and that each individual has 
their own preferences by using information about consumption of singles and couples 
and by a consumption technology function, which summarizes the economies of scale 
and scope that result from living together. 
First, we considered the case of an individual living alone. In this case, we do 
not have intra-household resource allocation and the household expenditure in leisure 
and consumption goods is equal to that of the single individual. In order to find the 
consumer surplus measure we can apply the traditional recreational demand model. 
                                                 
23 p-value = 0.000. 
24 p-value = 0.000. 
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Then, we considered the case with intra-household allocation of resources. 
This situation refers, for example, to couples that go to visit a recreational site. If the 
quality of the site changes household members might be willing to pay for the change 
in the site’s quality because it also affects the other member’s recreational activities 
and not only their own. They can recognize that the degradation of the site can cause a 
reallocation of income in the household. This can affect the change in exogenous 
income necessary to return the individual to the utility level that he or she experienced 
before the change. This yields different values for the change in quality of the area, 
compared to the values derived by using the traditional recreational model.  
The traditional recreational demand model assumes that a household acts as a 
single decision unit, even if it consists of different individuals. The traditional 
recreational model does not make any distinctions about the value of the site for 
different household members. The amount a household member would pay or be paid 
to be as well off with or without the quality change does not take into account the 
allocation of resources in the family, the differences in preferences or the differences 
in the opportunity cost of time of the household members. Individuals in a household 
can value a change in quality differently, depending on their opportunity cost of time, 
how the household income is allocated in the household, how much they like a 
particular site and how they use it. The collective recreational demand model 
developed in this study allows the derivation of consumer surplus measure for each 
household member taking into account the intra-household allocation of resources and 
that each individual has their own preferences. We also showed that the recreational 
demand of individual i depends not only on individual i’s time cost but also on the 
time cost of the other household members. 
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With the collective recreational demand model, the policy maker can use each 
household member’s consumer surplus in order to know how to regulate the access of 
a recreational site, how much to compensate different individuals in case of 
degradation of a natural environment and how to target programs to individuals in 
certain recreational activities groups rather than to households. 
We included children’s welfare by assuming that there is one altruistic 
member that takes into account the household members’ well-being. Following BCL, 
we assumed that the utility function of the woman and all the associated demand 
functions refer to the joint utility function of a woman and her children. It is not 
simple to relax this assumption, however. Children consume the same kind of goods 
as their parents. For example, the expenditure on food includes the wife’s 
consumption, the husband’s consumption and the child’s consumption. Usually it is 
not possible to distinguish these components in the data. 
We also focused on the behavior of a family and we did not account for the 
behavior of groups where individuals from different households choose to take a trip 
together. Relaxing this assumption will be the subject of forthcoming research 
applying the model by Chiappori and Ekeland (2006) about group behavior. 
At this point one could ask if the distinction between the traditional and the 
collective recreational demand model is merely an academic curiosity, or if 
differences in how resources are distributed within households reflect appreciable 
differences in the welfare measures. 
In this study, we made a first step in this direction. We tested the null 
hypothesis that, after controlling for income and other socio-economic characteristics, 
the recreational demand of husbands is not statistically different from the recreational 
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demand of wives. If the recreational demand of husbands and wives are the same then 
husband and wife responses may be treated identically, as in the traditional 
recreational demand model. We rejected the null hypothesis at the 1% statistical level. 
There are statistical differences in the recreational demand functions of husbands and 
wives. This implies that observations for husbands and wives may not be treated as 
identical as in the traditional recreational demand model (unless one spouse is the 
dictator). We also found that, in absolute value, the consumer surplus estimate derived 
from the traditional model appears to overestimate the consumer surplus of husbands 
and underestimate the consumer surplus of wives, and that wives have significantly 
higher consumer surplus than husbands for access at the West Garda Regional Forest.  
Even if these findings are referring to spouses not living in the same 
household, they imply that the collective setting is a plausible next step to take in the 
analysis of recreational demand model. 
It is left for future research the estimation of the collective model developed in 
this study in order to obtain the consumer surplus estimates of husband and wife from 
the same couple and the sharing rule. For an empirical application we need data about 
individuals living alone and together. This should allow us to use the demand data of 
people living alone to identify individual preferences, thereby leaving household data 
the job of identifying the consumption technology and the sharing rule. This will also 
be the subject of forthcoming research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Extension of the Traditional Travel Cost Method to a Collective Framework: 
An Empirical Application 
 
2.1 Introduction 
As we saw in the previous chapter the collective setting is a plausible next step to take 
in the analysis of recreational demand model. The traditional Travel Cost Method is 
limiting in that it can reveal consumer preferences for non-market goods by only 
capturing family behavior. It assumes that a household acts as an elementary decision 
making unit where all resources are pooled.  
Bockstael and McConnell (2006) note that ‘In the original paper on household 
production, Becker treated the household as the decision making unit, suggesting that 
intra-household allocations of consumption and production activities would be made 
‘optimally’ (p.512). In the forty years since that paper, little progress has been made 
in explaining this intra-household allocation process or in reconciling the distinction 
between the household as decision maker and the individual members as consumers.’ 
(p. 8, Chapter 4). 
McConnell (1999) attempts to address this issue by developing a recreational 
model based on two individuals (spouses) sharing income, household production and 
earning different wages. The limit in this approach is that the basic structure of the 
model is the unitary model that assumes income pooling, that a household has a single 
utility function and that there is not bargaining and intra-household allocation of 
resources between household members. 
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Smith and Van Houtven (1998, 2004) describe the implications of the 
collective model of household behavior for methods used to estimate the economic 
value of non-market goods but they do not present any empirical application and they 
do not estimate any welfare measures. 
Dosman and Adamowicz (2006) examine the choice of two spouses for a 
vacation site. They investigate intra-household bargaining using stated and revealed 
preference data. They ask each partner to make choices in a stated preference 
experiment and they use these choices to develop estimates of the spouses’ preference 
parameters. Then they construct a bargaining model where the household utility is 
defined as the weighted average utility of partners’ preferences.  
To the best of our knowledge, no papers exist that estimate the individual 
Willingness-To-Pay (WTP) for access to a recreational site for each household 
member by using only revealed preferences data or that apply a Travel Cost Method 
to a collective framework. 
In the previous chapter we made a step in this direction by developing a 
collective recreational demand model that uses information about the travel cost of 
singles and couples and by a consumption technology function, which summarizes the 
economies of scale and scope that result from living together. We also showed that 
the recreational demand and the consumer surplus estimate of husbands is statistically 
different from the recreational demand and the consumer surplus estimate of wives. 
However, because of the small sample size in the number of singles we could not 
apply the collective recreational demand model developed in that chapter. 
Two are the main contributions of this chapter to the recreational models 
literature: first, we show how to apply the collective model theory originally proposed 
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by Chiappori (1988, 1992) in a recreational setting by using revealed preference data 
from a travel cost survey; second, we show how to identify and estimate individual 
welfare measures, such as the equivalent variation (EV), to infer the WTP to access a 
natural park of each household member. We define the implemented method as 
‘Collective Travel Cost Method’ (CTCM). 
We adopt the identification strategy developed by Menon and Perali (2006). 
The minimal requirement information for the identification of the sharing rule within 
the household is to observe at least one assignable good.  
In the ‘Collective Travel Cost Method’ knowledge of the travel cost to the 
recreational site of each household member allows us to identify the sharing rule and 
to apply the CTCM to a recreational framework. In particular, we estimate a 
collective Almost Ideal Demand System that takes into account the role of each 
member’s preferences for trips to a recreational site and how resources are allocated 
within the household. 
Finally, the development and estimation of the CTCM allows: (1) to test if the 
WTP to access a recreational site estimated by the traditional unitary TCM is 
significantly different from the WTP estimated by the CTCM; (2) to test whether two 
spouses have equal or different WTP to access a recreational site, and (3) if the 
individual WTP estimated by the CTCM is significantly different from the WTP 
derived by applying the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) on the same sample of 
individuals. 
We find, (1) that the WTP obtained by applying the traditional TCM is 
significantly different from the WTP obtained by applying the CTCM; (2) that two 
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spouses have significantly different WTP and (3) that the CTCM allows to estimate 
respondent’s WTP closer to the CVM WTP than the traditional TCM.  
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes the basic structure 
of the Collective Travel Cost Method and describes the identification strategy of the 
sharing rule. Section 2.3 describes the empirical model used: the Collective Almost 
Ideal Demand System. Section 2.4 describes the data and the results. The last section 
concludes with suggestions for future research. 
 
2.2 Collective Travel Cost Method and Sharing Rule Identification 
In this section, first we develop a ‘Collective Travel Cost Method’ (CTCM) by 
applying the collective model of household behavior of Chiappori (1988, 1992) then 
we describe the identification strategy of the sharing rule between household 
members developed by Menon and Perali (2006). We define it as ‘Collective Travel 
Cost Method’ (CTCM) since we use the individual expenditure to visit a recreational 
site (i.e. ‘the annual travel cost’) as necessary variables for the identification of the 
sharing rule. 
We consider a household consisting of two members, individual r (‘the 
respondent’ of on-site survey, for example) and individual s (‘the spouse’). However, 
we can interpret one of the utility of the two members as a joint utility function for all 
but one member of the household. For example, as we will see in our empirical 
application, one utility can represent the utility of the respondent to the survey and the 
other utility represent the joint utility of all the family members of the respondent (e.g. 
the spouse with the children).  
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Let the superscripts refer to household members and subscripts to goods. Each 
household’s member i (i = r, s) consumes assignable private goods ( )1 ,...,i iNx x=ix  at 
price pi and composite goods Qi (Q = Qr + Qs). For simplicity, assume Qi’s price is 
normalized to unity.  
Let Ui(xi, Q) be the egoistic direct utility function of individual i. 
 
Assumption A1: Each individual has a monotonically increasing, continuous 
twice differentiable and strictly quasi concave utility function25 Ui(xi, Q) over a 
bundle of N goods xi.26
Assumption A2: Given the budget constraint the household makes Pareto 
efficient decisions, i.e. the household choice of xr and xs maximizes the weighted sum 
of the individual utilities subject to the budget constraint: 
( )
,
max ( , ) 1 ( , )
r s
r r s s
r r s s
W U U
subject to Y
μ μ= + −
+ + =
x x
x Q x Q
p x p x Q
 (2.1) 
where pi is the vector of market prices for the goods consumed xi; Y represents the 
total household income, which is exogenous, and μ represents the Pareto weight with: 
[ ]0,1μ ∈ . The Pareto weight can be seen as a measure of individual r’s bargaining 
power in the decision process. The larger the value of μ is, the greater is the weight 
that individual r’s preferences receive. If μ = 1 then the household behaves as though 
                                                 
25 Individual utility are represented by egoistic preferences but it is not necessary to recover individual 
behavior. We could use a caring utility function ( ) ( )1 2 2,i iu U U U= ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦1x x%%  without altering the 
conclusion of the model (Chiappori, 1992). 
26 For notational simplicity, we have suppressed the demographic variables that we will include in the 
empirical application.  
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individual r has the bargaining power in the family, whereas if μ = 0 then it is as 
though individual s is the effective dictator. μ is assumed continuously differentiable 
in its arguments and it depends on a set of exogenous variables z that can affect the 
bargaining power in the household and the intra-household allocation of resources 
(Browning et al., 1994). If the variables z affect the balance of power μ without 
affecting preferences and the budget constraints, then these variables are defined as 
‘distributional factors’. Examples of distribution factors are non-labor income 
(Thomas, 1990), individual wages (Browning et al., 1994), spouses’ wealth at 
marriage (Thomas et al., 1997), the targeting of specific benefits to particular 
members (Duflo, 2000), sex ration and divorce legislation (Chiappori et al., 2002).27  
In equation (2.1) W can be interpreted as ‘a social welfare function for the 
household,’ in which each household member has different bargaining power, or 
alternatively as some specific bargaining model (e.g. Nash bargaining). The 
assumption that the household outcomes are Pareto efficient does not exclude the 
situation of household experiencing marriage dissolution. The distributional factors 
can affect the threat points in the marriage and household members can be viewed as 
players of repeated games with symmetric information, and therefore efficiency is a 
reasonable assumption. 
The household’s behavior can be represented by a two-stage budget 
decomposition. Partners first divide household income Y between them according to 
some predetermined but unknown sharing rule φ. Then, once income has been 
allocated, each member chooses her optimal consumption bundle by maximizing 
his/her utility subject to the budget constraint based on their respective share of 
                                                 
27 See Chiappori and Ekeland (2006) for a general discussion. 
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household income. The additive separable objective function in (1) implies that an 
equivalent statement for each household member’s objective function can be written 
as follows 
max Ui(xi, Qi) subject to +i i ip x Q = φi (2.2) 
where φi is the fraction of shadow income allocated to member i, φ1 + φ2 = Y. 
Under assumption A2 of Pareto efficiency, solutions to the individual problem 
(2.2) must be equal to those obtained solving the household problem (2.1). 
Unfortunately, in practice we cannot observe these two artificial stages. We 
observe the individual and household choices xi and Q. Menon and Perali (2006) 
show that this information is enough for identifying the sharing rule without the need 
of using distributional factors as Chiappori et al. (2002) do and without the 
computational burden of the identification strategy of Chiappori (1988, 1992) that 
requires the calculation of second derivatives. They show that their identification 
strategy brings to comparable estimates of the parameters of the sharing rule to these 
alternatives approaches. We follow Menon and Perali (2006) because in the 
recreational field it is not always easy to find distributional factors and because of 
their computational simplicity in the identification of the sharing rule. 
 
2.2.1 Sharing Rule Identification 
The identification strategy developed by Menon and Perali (2006) is based on a 
technique commonly used in the literature to include demographic or other exogenous 
effects into demand systems (Pollack and Wales 1981; Lewbel 1985) and to estimate 
household technologies (Bollino et al. 2000). While in this literature demographic 
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variables interact with prices or income, in their case the unobservable sharing rule 
interacts with individual total expenditure a la Barten (Barten 1964; Perali 2003). 
The minimal information required to identify of the sharing rule is to observe 
at least one assignable good or two exclusive goods. We define a good exclusive 
when it can be consumed only by one individual and not the other (e.g. female and 
male clothing). We define a good assignable if we know how much is consumed 
separately by each individual (that is xr and xs are observed). In the Collective Travel 
Cost Method knowledge of the travel cost to a recreational site of individual r (the 
respondent) and s (the spouse) allows us to identify the sharing rule. Since the usage 
of the car is shared when they ride together, the travel cost can be considered an 
assignable good. 
The individual total expenditure in most cases is not observed. However, we 
can approximate it as 
2
i i Y xy x −⎛= + ⎜⎝ ⎠
⎞⎟ , where xi is individual i’s assignable 
expenditure, Y is income, x is the assignable household expenditure ( )r sx x x= + , and 
represents the non-assignable household expenditure, which is divided by the 
total number of household members by assuming a uniform distribution between 
household members. In the recreational case the individual i’s assignable expenditure 
is derived by multiplying the individual’s travel cost by his/her annual number of trips 
to the recreational site. 
(Y x− )
 
Assumption A3: Let the sharing rule of individual i be a continuous function 
of exogenous variables z and individual total expenditure yi:  
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( ),i i i iy y mφ =z z( )  (2.3) 
where i = r, s; mi(z) is a scaling function such that 0 ( )
i
i
im y
φ≤ ≤z  and z can include 
wages, prices, non-labor income or other variables that can affect the intrahousehold 
allocation of resources or the bargaining between household members. In logarithm 
form the sharing rule becomes 
( )ln , ln ln ( )i i i iy y mφ = +z z   (2.4) 
where we define 
1
ln ( )
H
i
h h
h
m zγ
=
= ∑z . This specification tells us that the sharing rule 
can be interpreted as a shadow income post-intrahousehold allocation. The function 
m(z) describes the size and direction of the allocation of resources between household 
member. It also tells us that the amount of resources allocated to individual i is 
different from the amount that we observed the individual spending (yr). For example 
the expenditure for a trip of individual r depends on observed costs such as gasoline 
and the time cost of the individual r going to the site, but it may also depend on the 
time cost of the other household member that may stay home to take care of the 
children. Further note that m(z) is not constrained between [0,1] because it interacts 
with the individual total expenditure yi. 
The objective of the identification strategy is to recover the partial effects of 
the sharing rule with respect to the exogenous variables z. Menon and Perali (2006) 
show that the partial effects can be estimated directly from the structural functional 
form of demand equations. This approach has two main advantages: the first one is 
that it is computationally simpler than a reduced form approach, such as the one 
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implemented by Chiappori et al. (2002), and the second one that it can be applied into 
estimations of complete demand systems, such as the one described and applied in the 
next sections. 
In this section we present the identification of the partial effects of the sharing 
rule by using the structural specification of the recreational demand for trips to a 
natural park of household members r and s. Consider the following structural forms: 
( )0 1 2 3 1 2ln ln ln lntc tc tcr r r r r s zN d p y p p zα α α α γ γ γ= + + + + + +  (2.5) 
( )0 1 2 3 1 2ln ln lntc tc tcs s s s r s zN d p y p p zβ β β β γ γ γ= + + + − − −  (2.6) 
with ( )1 2ln (ln ln ); ln ln ln and ln lntc tci i i r r s sz ry m m p p z m mφ γ γ γ= + = + + = − : 
where Nr and Ns correspond to the annual number of trips to a recreational site of 
individuals r and s; dr and ds are demographic characteristics of each individual; 
tc
rp  
and 
tc
sp  represent individuals r and s’ travel costs; z are exogenous characteristics that 
can affect the intrahousehold allocation of resources (such as the number of children 
in the household or the presence of a disable), and yr and ys correspond to the total 
individual expenditure. 
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It follows that the parameters of the sharing rule and of the travel cost 
variables are identified as long as the partial derivatives of the recreational demand 
with respect to the individuals’ total expenditure (i.e. A = α4 , B = β4) are known: 
1
2
3
/
/
/ /
r
tc
s
tc
r
p
r
p
r
z
F E
C A
D A H E
φ γ
φ γ
φ γ
= = −
= =
= = = −
 and 
2
2
/
/
B AF E
G CE A
α
β
= +
= + . 
Once the parameters are identified, the value of the site, which can be 
interpreted as the Willingness-To-Pay of the individual to access to the site, is derived 
by calculating the individual’s consumer surplus (CS). The individual’s consumer 
surplus is the area behind the individual’s recreational demand for trips to the site and 
above the observed level of constant marginal travel cost 
tc
ip  to produce trips Ni. By 
assuming a Poisson distribution, the consumer surplus (CS) of each individual 
becomes 
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(2.8) 
2 4 1
r
r NCS α α γ= − +  and 2 4 2
s
s NCS β β γ= − −  (2.9). 
 
2.3 A Collective Almost Ideal Demand System for Non-market Valuation 
In our empirical application we assume that household members have preferences 
given by the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). 
In this section we extend the AIDS demand system to a collective framework by 
including the sharing rule between household members. The knowledge of the sharing 
rule allows the estimation of the individual indirect utility function and the individual 
expenditure functions, which can be used to find individual’s welfare measures such 
us the compensating variation and the equivalent variation.  
We estimate the AIDS demand system because it has numerous advantages: it 
gives an arbitrary first-order approximation to any demand system; it satisfies the 
axioms of choice; it does not impose any priori restriction on the elasticities; it has a 
functional form which is consistent with known household-budget data; it is simple to 
estimate, largely avoiding the need for non-linear estimation; and it can be used to test 
the restrictions of homogeneity and symmetry through linear restrictions on fixed 
parameters (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). 
We choose the complete demand system specification to the single demand 
equations described in the previous section because the estimation only of single 
demand equation ignores interactions between demands of commodities and this may 
give us a wrong picture. By incorporating the budget constraint into the analysis, the 
complete system approach instead forces recognition of the fact that an increase in 
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expenditure on one consumption category must be balanced by decreases in the 
expenditure on others. 
Moreover, the complete system approach permits the separation of 
demographic effects from own and cross price effects as well as income effects. We 
propose the Barten-Gorman translating method, which translates the budget line 
through the fixed cost element, as a general method for incorporating demographic 
variables into complete systems of demand equations (Pollak and Wales, 1978). If we 
focus on visitor’s expenditure, we can identify at least three variables significantly 
affecting patterns of spending: income, prices and socio-demographic characteristic of 
the visitor. A demand system which incorporates demographic variables helps to 
examine these effects at the same time.  
 
Assumption A4: Individuals (i = r, s) have demand functions given by the 
integrable AIDS demand system. 
Assumption A5: The Translog price aggregator Ai(p) and the Gorman scaling 
demographic term Δ i are equal across household members, that 
is 1( ) ( ) ( )
2
r sA A A= =p p p  and 1
2
r sΔ = Δ = Δ . 
 
Proposition P1: Let Assumptions A1, A2, A3, A4 and A5 hold. If individual r 
and s’ expenditures in at least one assignable good or two exclusive goods are 
observed then the sharing rule φi, the individual indirect utilities ( ,iV )iφp  and the 
individual expenditures functions ( ),i iE Up  are identified. 
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As showed in the previous section, for non-market valuation of a recreational 
site the travel cost to the site of individual r (the respondent) and s (the spouse) can be 
considered assignable and it can allows us to identify the sharing rule.  
Let individual i’s indirect utility function be 
( ) ( )* 12ln ( ), ( )
i
i i
i
y A
V
B
φ ⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦= pp
p
 (2.10) 
where  
- p is the price vector of goods k-th; 
- * 12ln lni iy φ= − Δ k
z
z
, with  and  be a 
scaling demographic function with d socio-demographic variables, and p
1
( ) ln( )
N
k
k
t d p
=
Δ = ∑
1
( )
kh
H
k h
h
t d dτ
=
= ∑
k the price of 
good k; 
-  by Assumption 3 and equation (2.4) with ( )ln , ln ln ( )i i i iy y mφ = +z
1
ln ( )
H
i
h h
h
m γ
=
= ∑z ; yi individual i’s total expenditure; z exogenous variables that 
affect the distribution of resources within the household; 
- 
0
11
2
1 1 1
( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )
k kj
N N N
k k j
k k j
p pα α γ
= = =
= + +∑ ∑∑p ( ) ikki kp , and BA βp= Πp . 
By applying the duality relationship ( ), ( , )i i i iE V φ y=p p  we obtain the 
associated log-expenditure function for individual i: 
( ) ( )1 12 2ln , ( ) ( ) lni i i i iE U A U B m z= + + +p p p Δ  (2.11) 
where 1 12 2( ) ln ( )i i iU B Aφ= − −p p Δ . 
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By assuming that the household expenditure function is weakly separable the 
corresponding log-household expenditure function becomes  
( )ln , ( ) ( ) ( )r r s sE U A U B U B= + + +p p p p Δ   (2.12). 
Roy’s identity yields the collective system of share equations 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* *
1
ln ln ( ) ln ( )
kj k i
N
r r s s
k k k j
j
w t d p y A y Aα γ β β
=
⎡ ⎤ ⎡= + + + − + − ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣∑ ⎦p p (2.13). 
The theoretical restrictions are homogeneity: 
1
0
N
kj
j
γ
=
= ;∑   adding-up: 
 and symmetry: 
1
0
kh
H
h
τ
=
= ;∑
1;   0;   0
N N N
k k kj
k k k
α β γ= =∑ ∑ ∑ = ; kj jkγ γ= . 
For non-market valuation this demand system includes the annual individual 
shares of household income that individual r and s spent for the recreational site. The 
vector of prices p includes the travel costs of individual r and s to the recreational site 
(
tc
rp  and 
tc
sp ). 
Once estimated this demand system we take the exponential of (2.11) to 
estimate the expenditure functions for individuals r and s. This allows us to find 
individual welfare measures such as the compensating variation (CV) and the 
equivalent variation (EV). 
Let  be the choke price, which is the travel cost that drives at zero 
individual i’s demand for trips to the recreational site. Let  be the observed travel 
cost and  the observed prices of all the other goods in the complete demand system 
with the exception of the travel cost. Let  be the utility level of individual i at the 
,1i
tcp
,0i
tcp
1
0
−p
,0iU
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observed travel cost , and  the utility level of individual i at the choke price 
;  and  are defined as A(p) and B
,0i
tcp
,1iU
,1i
tcp 1
,1 0( ,itcA p −p ) )1
,1 0( ,itcB p −p
i(p) above with the only 
difference that they are evaluated at the choke price . We have that the 
compensating variation (CV) and the equivalent variation (EV) can be written as  
,1i
tcp
( ) ( )1,1 0 ,0 ,0 0 ,0, , , ,i i i i i i itc tcCV E p U E p U−= −p p 1−   (2.14) 
( ) ( )1,1 0 ,1 ,0 0 ,1, , , ,i i i i i i itc tcEV E p U E p U−= −p p 1−   (2.15) 
where 
( ) ( )1 1 1,1 0 ,0 ,1 0 ,0 ,1 01 12 2, , exp ( , ) ( , ) lni i i i i i i itc tc tcE p U A p U B p m z− − −⎡ ⎤= + +⎣ ⎦p p p + Δ  (2.16) 
( ) ( )1 1 1,0 0 ,0 ,0 0 ,0 ,0 01 12 2, , exp ( , ) ( , ) lni i i i i i i itc tc tcE p U A p U B p m z− − −⎡ ⎤= + +⎣ ⎦p p p + Δ  (2.17) 
( ) ( )1 1 1,1 0 ,1 ,1 0 ,1 ,1 01 12 2, , exp ( , ) ( , ) lni i i i i i i itc tc tcE p U A p U B p m z− − −⎡ ⎤= + +⎣ ⎦p p p + Δ  (2.18) 
( ) ( )1 1 1,0 0 ,1 ,0 0 ,1 ,0 01 12 2, , exp ( , ) ( , ) lni i i i i i i itc tc tcE p U A p U B p m z− − −⎡ ⎤= + +⎣ ⎦p p p + Δ  (2.19) 
The policy maker can use the individual i’s equivalent variation in order to 
know individual i’s Willingness-To-Pay to access a recreational site. This information 
can then be used to regulate the access at the area or for example to target programs to 
individuals in certain recreational activities groups rather than to households. 
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2.4 Empirical Application 
2.4.1 Study Site and Data Gathering 
The sample is drawn from an onsite survey conducted by the Department of 
Economics of the University of Verona on the West side of Garda Lake in the 
Northeast of Italy from June to October 1997. This survey was part of an integrated 
analysis on the multi-functionality of the West Garda Regional Forest in order to 
define cooperative policies between institutions, local operators and visitors. 28 This 
area was picked because it was also felt that, due to Garda Lake’s popularity with 
tourists from throughout the country and abroad, there would be sufficient variation in 
distance travelled, time and trip cost. 
The respondent was asked to recall the number of annual trips made to the 
West Garda Regional Forest and the number of trips to other natural areas during the 
year. In order to double check the declared costs, visitors were asked to specify their 
place of residence, the distance travelled between the natural area and their residence, 
the journey time and for those who were on vacation, the distance from the forest to 
their vacation lodging. 
Moreover, the following data were collected for the respondent: means of 
transportation used, number of passengers per means of transportation, how many 
family members and how many shared the expense of the trip; if stops were made at 
other places before going to the natural area; how many days the trip lasted, 
occupation, weekly number of hours of work, number of children less than 12 years 
                                                 
28 For a detailed description of the survey see the Annex. 
 63
old in the household, household income and monthly household expenditure in food 
and leisure. In order to estimate the expenditure on alternative sites, the visitor was 
asked about the distance from the residence, the number of visits to each site, the 
quality of the area and the purpose of the trip. 
The survey was not conducted with the purpose to estimate a collective travel 
cost model and neither to compare the Willingness-To-Pay of two spouses. This 
implies that we do not have any socio-demographic information for the spouse of the 
respondent. But since each respondent was asked to recall how much he or she spent 
for the trip and how much his family spent for the trip in terms of food, lodging and 
transport this allows us to compute the respondent’s travel cost and his/her family 
members’ travel cost.29 The knowledge of assignable expenditure represents the 
minimal requirement for applying the Collective Travel Cost Method, identifying the 
sharing rule and individual welfare measures. We select only married people and the 
total sample size becomes of 225 observations.  
 
2.4.2 Parameter Estimates and Analysis 
According to the idea of complete demand system visitors of the West Garda 
Regional Forest proceed to allocate total income among the broad groups food, leisure 
and other goods. They also decide how to distribute the expenditure for leisure in trips 
to West Garda Regional Forest, trips to other sites and other leisure. 
                                                 
29 Several studies apply and compare different values to estimate the opportunity cost of time (for 
example Cesario, 1976; McConnell and Strand, 1981; Johnson, 1983; Smith et al., 1983; Chavas et al., 
1989; Bockstael et al., 1990; McKean et al., 1996). In this study we evaluate travel time at one third of 
the respondent’ wage rate (Cesario, 1976) and we assume that respondent and spouse have the same 
wage rate. 
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In our empirical application i = r refers to the respondent and i = s to the 
group ‘other family members’, that is the spouse with children. The expenditure for 
leisure in trips to West Garda Regional Forest is divided into the amount that the 
respondent declared to have spent for him/her self and into the amount that his/her 
family members spent in trips to the West Garda Regional Forest30. 
The vector of budget shares w consists of the shares of total household income 
that the respondent and the other families members spent into trips to the West Garda 
Regional Forest (respectively, Garda_trips_r and Garda_trips_s), and of the shares of 
total household income that the household spent in food (Food_hh), in trips to other 
recreational sites (Other_trips_hh), in other leisure (Other_leisure_hh) and in other 
goods (Other_goods_hh).  
The shares of each good are specified as a system of equations according to 
the Collective Almost Ideal Demand System described in equation (2.13) of Section 
2.3.  
Table 2.1 and 2.2 present the descriptive statistics for the selected variables.  
 
                                                 
30 In order to find the annual expenditure for leisure in trips to West Garda Regional Forest we multiply 
the travel cost of one visit by the annual total number of trips to the natural area. In the case of the 
spouse we simulate the annual total number of trips by predicting the probability that the respondent 
travels alone, with and without family members and by multiplying this probability by the total number 
of trips. 
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Table 2.1 - Definition of the Variables in the Collective AIDS Demand System 
Variable Description 
Shares   
Food_hh Household annual expenditure share in food 
Garda_trips_r Respondent annual expenditure in trips to West Garda Regional Forest park  
Ggarda_trips_s Spouse annual expenditure share in trips to West Garda Regional Forest 
Other_trips_hh Household annual expenditure share in other recreational trips 
Other_leisure_hh Household annual expenditure share in other leisure 
Other_goods_hh Household annual expenditure share in other goods 
   
Prices in Euros   
income Household annual income 
lnp(food_hh) Log(household annual expenditure in food) 
lnp(trips_r) Log(respondent annual expenditure in trips to West Garda Regional Forest) 
lnp(trips_s) Log(spouse annual expenditure in trips to West Garda Regional Forest) 
lnp(other_trips_hh) Log(household annual expenditure in trips to other recreational sites) 
lnp(other_leisure_hh) Log(household annual expenditure in other leisure) 
lnp(othergoods_hh) Log(household annual expenditure in other goods) 
   
Demographic variables   
sex_r  =1 if respondent is male; 0 if female 
age_r Respondent’s age / 10 
education_r Respondent’s number of years of school /10 
famsize Number of household members 
children_d  = 1 if there are children < 12 years old in the household 
nationality_r  = 1 if respondent is Italian 
visit duration_r Number of days of visit to West Garda Regional Forest 
   
Sharing Rule’s regressors   
num_children Number of children in the household 
log(wage_r) Log(respondent’s wage) 
huntfish*nofam Interaction term: huntfish = 1 if respondent is hunter or fisherman; 
nofam = 1 if respondent travels without family members 
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Table 2.2 - Descriptive Statistics for Variables in the Collective AIDS Demand System 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Shares     
Food_hh 0.2602 0.1485 0.0321 0.7692
Garda_trips_r 0.0105 0.0182 0.0002 0.1751
Garda_trips_s 0.0024 0.0082 0.0000 0.1039
Other_trips_hh 0.0027 0.0041 0.0000 0.0231
Other_leisure_hh 0.0915 0.0715 0.0010 0.4689
Other_goods_hh 0.6328 0.1814 0.0476 0.9464
     
Expenditures and Prices in Euros   
income 25208.33 13526.17 7436.98 67490.59
lnp(food_hh) 8.4964 0.4623 7.2402 9.6482
lnp(trips_r) 3.5872 1.1810 0.0324 6.8009
lnp(trips_s) 3.1334 0.8982 0.9487 6.4838
lnp(other_trips_hh) 3.1157 1.1194 0.1865 6.0610
lnp(other_leisure_hh) 7.2969 0.8403 3.7213 9.7615
lnp(othergoods_hh) 9.4809 0.8215 6.4293 10.9347
     
Demographic variables    
sex_r 0.6178 0.4870 0 1
age_r 4.4418 1.1330 2.2 7.7
education_r 1.2342 0.4241 0.5 2.1
famsize 3.2489 1.0692 2 7
children_d 0.3333 0.4725 0 1
nationality_r 0.7822 0.4137 0 1
visit duration_r 5.6133 10.0772 1 90
     
Sharing Rule’s regressors    
num_children 0.5067 0.8405 0 4
log(wage_r) 2.5213 0.5115 1.3541 4.0622
huntfish*nofam 0.0578 0.2338 0 1
Number of observations = 225    
 
The independent variables included in the collective AIDS model are the 
logarithm of the prices of the goods, if the respondent is male and if he or she is 
Italian, respondent’s age and number of years of education, the number of family 
members, if there are dependent children less than 12 years old and how long the visit 
to the West Garda Regional Forest lasts. We use the logarithm of the expenditure as 
an approximation of the price for each good. 
 67
 68
                                                
Zero observed shares such as the household share expenditure for other 
recreational sites or the other family members’ share expenditure in trips to the West 
Garda Regional Forest are corrected by the Heckman two-stage estimation procedure 
described in the Appendix31. If only nonzero visit observations are used in the 
parameter estimation, ordinary least square procedures would yield inconsistent 
estimates from selectivity bias.32
Table 2.3 shows the estimated parameters. The signs are consistent with the 
underlying theory. In general the price parameters are significant and the respondent’s 
demographic variables significantly affect the expenditure shares of trips to the West 
Garda Regional Forest with the exception of respondent’s age and education: for 
example the presence of children or the fact that the respondent is male has a positive 
statistically significant effect (respectively at the 5 and 1% level) on the individual 
expenditure share of trips, ceteris paribus. 
 
31 In order to apply this procedure we create dummies variables equal to zero when the expenditures are 
zero and equal to one otherwise. As instruments we use the distance from the place of residence, the 
total number of hours that the respondent would have wished to spend at the recreational site, the total 
number of hours that the respondent would have wished to spend in hunting, fishing or harvesting 
flowers and mushroom; and the total number of hours that the respondent spent at the site mountain 
biking, horse riding, hiking, picnicking and visiting historic places. 
32 Full Information Maximum likelihood estimates for the collective AIDS demand model were 
obtained using the maximum likelihood routine in the computer package Gauss and after having 
dropped one of the six share equations, namely, the expenditure share of other leisure. Barten (1969) 
shows that the results are invariant to the equation deleted. The coefficients of the deleted equation are 
easily calculated, since they are linear combination of the parameters of the share equations included. 
    Dependent Variable: Expenditure share of 
Independent Variable   Food_hh Garda_trips_r Other_goods_hh Garda_trips_s Other_trips_hh Other_leisure_hh 
   Param.  Std.Err. Param.  Std.Err. Param.  Std.Err. Param.  Std.Err. Param.  Std.Err. Param.  Std.Err. 
Constant αk 0.2745 *** 0.0664 0.0477   0.0314 0.4138 *** 0.0710 0.0075   0.0291 0.0267 *** 0.0101 0.2298 *** 0.0061 
Prices                          
lnp(food_hh) γkj 0.1780 *** 0.0071 -0.0017  0.0023 -0.1513 *** 0.0044 0.0001  0.0021 -0.0019 ** 0.0009 -0.0232  0.0584 
lnp(trips_r)       0.0037 ** 0.0314 -0.0013  0.0017 0.0000  0.0010 0.0010 ** 0.0004 -0.0017  0.0032 
lnp(othergoods_hh)          0.1962 *** 0.0039 -0.0032 ** 0.0015 -0.0019 *** 0.0006 -0.0385 *** 0.0016 
lnp(trips_s)               0.0038 *** 0.0011 -0.0003  0.0004 -0.0004  0.0025 
lnp(other_trips_hh)                  0.0032 *** 0.0004 -0.0001  0.0013 
lnp(other_leisure_hh)                                0.0639 *** 0.0027 
 βkr -0.0163  0.0108 0.0205 *** 0.0050 -0.0093  0.0100 0.0103 ** 0.0046 0.0028 * 0.0016 -0.0080 *** 0.0005 
  βkr -0.0140 * 0.0081 0.0029   0.0053 0.0088   0.0101 -0.0018   0.0043 0.0003   0.0013 0.0038   0.0110 
Demographics                          
sex_r τkh 0.0035  0.0049 0.0063 *** 0.0019 -0.0075  0.0049 0.0040 * 0.0023 -0.0002  0.0008 -0.0061  0.0074 
age_r   -0.0030  0.0023 0.0000  0.0008 0.0019  0.0023 0.0004  0.0011 -0.0002  0.0004 0.0009  0.0052 
education_r   -0.0043  0.0063 0.0003  0.0022 0.0071  0.0061 -0.0008  0.0031 0.0008  0.0010 -0.0031  0.0024 
famsize   0.0027  0.0074 0.0150 *** 0.0033 -0.0191 ** 0.0095 0.0107 *** 0.0033 0.0026 * 0.0014 -0.0119 * 0.0067 
children_d   -0.0003  0.0084 0.0106 ** 0.0043 -0.0082  0.0106 0.0147 *** 0.0042 0.0015  0.0014 -0.0183 *** 0.0079 
nationality_r   0.0051  0.0078 0.0009  0.0030 -0.0048  0.0079 0.0039 * 0.0035 0.0018  0.0013 -0.0069  0.0086 
visit length_r   -0.0029   0.0025 0.0061 *** 0.0009 -0.0048 ** 0.0025 0.0011   0.0013 -0.0008   0.0005 0.0013   0.0074 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level; Number of observations = 225 
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Table 2.3 – Estimates of the Collective AIDS Demand System 
 
 
Table 2.4 reports the income, demographic and compensated price elasticities 
computed at the mean of budget shares by using numerical procedures. The signs are 
as expected: positive for the income elasticities and negative for the own-price 
elasticities. The trips to the West Garda Regional Forest represent the most responsive 
goods to income and price changes while food the most necessary and less elastic 
good. The number of children and the family size has a positive impact on the trips to 
the recreational area and a negative impact on food. This is consistent with what 
found in other studies (e.g. Koc and Alpay, 2003; Arias et al. 2003). 
Respondent’s number of trips to the West Garda Regional Forest is in a 
complementary-type relationship with the other family members’ number of trips to 
the West Garda Regional Forest but it is a substitute for food and other goods. The 
duration of the visit to the natural area has a negative effect on the trips to the other 
recreational sites. The number of years of education of the respondent has a positive 
effect on his/her expenditure in trips to the natural area but a negative impact on the 
other family members’ expenditure in trips to the same natural area. 
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Table 2.4 – Income, Demographic and Compensated Price Elasticities 
(at Mean Budget Shares) 
Income Elasticities 
  Food_hh Garda_trips_r Other_goods_hh Garda_trips_s Other_trips_hh Other_leisure_hh
Income 0.9422 1.6824 1.0039 1.4675 1.2264 0.997
              
Compensated Own and Cross Price Elasticties 
  Prices 
Good k Food_hh Garda_trips_r Other_goods_hh Garda_trips_s Other_trips_hh Other_leisure_hh
Food_hh -0.0451 0.0160 0.0808 0.0094 -0.0009 0.0004
Garda_trips_r 0.0090 -0.8506 -0.1388 -0.0525 0.0552 -0.1053
Other_goods_hh 0.0186 0.0114 -0.0542 0.0003 0.0021 0.0266
Garda_trips_s 0.1338 -0.1291 -0.7020 -0.3176 -0.0718 -0.0777
Other_trips_hh -0.1618 0.1547 0.0296 -0.0711 -0.3685 0.0422
Other_leisure_hh -0.0025 -0.0015 0.2171 0.0015 0.0045 -0.1754
Demographic Elasticties 
  Good k 
Demographic 
variables Food_hh Garda_trips_r Other_goods_hh Garda_trips_s Other_trips_hh Other_leisure_hh
sex_r 0.0077 0.5698 -0.0119 0.8507 0.0007 -0.0738
age_r -0.0118 0.0040 0.0029 0.0812 -0.0428 0.0103
education_r -0.0156 0.0085 0.0112 -0.1720 0.1539 -0.0356
famsize -0.0072 1.3971 -0.0303 2.2902 0.6040 -0.1434
children_d -0.0161 1.0221 -0.0131 3.0170 0.3697 -0.2146
nationality_r 0.0160 0.1275 -0.0077 0.8053 0.3816 -0.0808
visit duration_r -0.0158 0.5262 -0.0077 0.2635 -0.1333 0.0142
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2.4.3 The Sharing Rule  
As Table 2.5 shows, we use as factors z that can affect the distribution of resources 
within the household the number of children (num_children), the respondent’s wage 
(log(wage_r)) and an interaction term that captures if the respondent is hunter or 
fisherman and travels without family member (huntfish*nofam). The respondent’s 
wage is significant at the 5% statistical level and it positively affects the sharing rule: 
respondents with higher wages tend to allocate more resources to themselves than to 
the other family members. The number of children affects negatively the sharing rule 
at the 1% significant level. Figure 2.1 shows the relative sharing rule (that is the 
sharing rule divided by total household income, φr/Y) by the number of children. As 
the number of children increases the share of resources allocated to the respondent 
decreases. This is consistent with our expectations since in our sample the spouse is 
also representative of the preferences of the children.  
Table 2.5 - Sharing Rule Parameter Estimates 
 Parameter  Std. Error 
num_children -0.4395 *** 0.1384 
log(wage_r) 0.6065 ** 0.2826 
huntfish*nofam 0.1671  0.2477 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level; 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level;  
Number of observations = 225 
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Figure 2.1 – Relative Sharing Rule by Number of Children 
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Figure 2.2 represents another interesting result. It shows how the estimated 
relative sharing rule varies in relation to total household income. As we can see, there 
is a clear decreasing relationship: if the household income increases the amount of 
resources allocated to the respondent decreases or, in other words, respondents of 
households with lower levels of total income have a lower propensity to transfer 
resources to the other family members. 
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Figure 2.2 – Relative Sharing Rule by Total Household Income 
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2.4.4 Welfare Comparisons and Individual Willingness-To-Pay (WTP)  
The estimated collective AIDS demand system allows us to derive the individual 
expenditure functions for the respondent and the other family members by 
substituting the estimated parameters of Table 2.3 into equations (2.16)-(2.19)33. 
Once we have estimated the respondent and the other family members’ expenditures 
in order to find the equivalent variation we can apply equation (2.15), which gives us 
the individual Willingness-To-Pay to access the West Garda Regional Forest. We 
define it CTCM_WTP since it derives from the application of the Collective Travel 
Cost Method34.  
                                                 
33 The price , which drives the number of trips at zero, has been calculated by using numerical 
procedures. 
,1i
tcp
34 Note that the WTP figures that follow have been divided by the annual number of trips, so they refer 
to the WTP per one trip to the West Garda Regional Forest. 
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Then we want to test: (1) whether the respondent’s mean WTP per one trip to 
the recreational site estimated by the traditional unitary TCM (TCM_WTP) is 
significantly different from the respondent’s mean WTP obtained by applying the 
CTCM (CTCM_ WTP); (2) whether two spouses have equal or different mean WTP 
to access the recreational site, and (3) whether the respondent’s mean WTP estimated 
by the Travel Cost Method is significantly different from the mean WTP derived by 
applying the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM_WTP) on the same sample of 
individuals. Does the CTCM disentangle the bundle between stated and revealed 
preference Willingness-To-Pay? 
With regards to Test (1) Table 2.6 shows that the traditional TCM and the 
collective TCM give significantly different mean WTP estimates (at the 1% statistical 
level). In particular the traditional TCM, which does not consider the intra-household 
allocation of resources and it assumed that all the resources are pooled, overstates the 
mean WTP of the respondent. 
 
Table 2.6 – Test (1): Is the Mean Willingness-To-Pay (WTP) Figure from the 
Traditional Travel Cost Method (TCM) Equal to the Mean WTP  
from the Collective TCM? 
Test (1) 
Ho: mean(TCM_WTP_r) = mean(CTCM_WTP_r) 
    Mean Std.Err. Std. Dev.  95% Conf. Interval 
TCM_WTP_r Respondent’s WTP 
(traditional TCM) 
6.5103 0.1985 2.9780 6.1191 6.9015 
CTCM_WTP_r Respondent’s WTP 
(Collective TCM) 
4.9369 0.4324 6.4857 4.0849 5.7890 
p-value 0.0017           
Number of observations = 225      
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 With regard to Test (2), the null hypothesis of no difference in WTP between 
two partners, that is the respondent and his/her spouse, is rejected at the 1% statistical 
level (Table 2.7). In order to test this hypothesis we selected households with only 
two family members. We find that the the respondent’s WTP is higher than the WTP 
of the spouse. This finding seems imply that the respondent cannot be considered as 
the representative individual in the household (i.e. his/her WTP does not represent the 
WTP of the other household members) as the traditional TCM instead assumes. 
Table 2.7 – Test (2): Is the Respondent’ Mean Willingness-To-Pay (WTP)  
Equal to the Spouse’s Mean WTP?  
Test (2) 
Ho: mean(CTCM_WTP_r) = mean(CTCM_WTP_s) 
    Mean Std.Err. Std. Dev.  95% Conf. Interval 
CTCM_WTP_r Respondent’s WTP 
(Collective TCM) 
13.3901 0.6877 5.7128 12.0177 14.7625 
CTCM_WTP_s Spouse’s WTP 
(Collective TCM) 
8.2947 0.2821 2.3436 7.7317 8.8577 
p-value 0.0000           
Number of observations = 69      
 
Finally, with regard to Test (3) we want to compare the WTP estimate from 
the Travel Cost Method with the WTP estimate from the Contingent Valuation 
Method. These two techniques are both estimating the Willingness-To-Pay for access 
to a recreational site but they differ in their approach. The CVM uses stated 
preference data (or hypothetical data) while TCM uses revealed preference data (or 
actual data). In order to find the WTP from the CVM we applied the discrete choice 
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CVM question format by Cooper et al. (2006) called ‘Fair-One-and-One-Half-Bound’ 
(FOOHB). In the Contingent Valuation survey a hypothetical market scenario is 
described to each respondent. Then respondents are asked whether they would be 
willing to pay for an entrance ticket and they are allowed to choose whether they want 
to start the questioning process with the low bid or the high bid. In other words, in 
order to make the survey ‘fair’ the starting price for the bidding process is chosen by 
the respondent and not by the interviewer. 
Both TCM and CVM have limitations and advantages. Consequently to 
investigate their validity the comparison of the welfare estimates from both 
techniques has received considerable attention in the literature (see for example 
Bishop et al. 1983; Sellar et al. 1985; Carson et al. 1996). 
In general, the WTP estimates from these two approaches are statistically 
different, as also Table 2.8 shows: the WTP from the traditional TCM is statistically 
different form the CVM WTP at the 1% level. In Table 2.9 we show that this 
difference is reduced once we use the Collective Travel Cost Method. Indeed, the 
WTP from the CTCM is now statistically different from the CVM WTP at the 5% 
level. 
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Table 2.8 – Test (3a): Is the Respondent’s Mean Willingness-To-Pay (WTP) 
from the Traditional TCM Equal to the Respondent’s Mean WTP 
from the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM)? 
Test (3a) 
Ho: mean(TCM_WTP_r) = mean(CVM_WTP_r)  
    Mean Std.Err. Std. Dev. 95% Conf. Interval 
TCM_ WTP _r 
Respondent’s WTP 
(Traditional TCM) 6.5103 0.1985 2.9780 6.1191 6.9015 
CVM_ WTP_r 
Respondent’s WTP 
(Contingent Valuation) 3.8477 0.0046 0.0683 3.8387 3.8567 
p-value 0.0000          
Number of observations = 225      
 
Table 2.9 – Test (3b): Is the respondent’s mean Willingness-To-Pay (WTP) 
from the Collective TCM equal to the respondent’s WTP 
from the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM)? 
Test (3b) 
Ho: mean(CTCM_WTP_r) = mean(CVM_WTP_r) 
    Mean Std.Err. Std. Dev. 95% Conf. Interval 
CTCM_ WTP _r 
Respondent’s WTP 
(Collective TCM) 4.9369 0.4324 6.4857 4.0849 5.7890 
CVM_ WTP_r 
Respondent’s WTP 
(Contingent Valuation) 3.8477 0.0046 0.0683 3.8387 3.8567 
p-value 0.0125           
Number of observations = 225      
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2.5 Conclusions 
This chapter is intended primarily to show how to estimate welfare measure for 
individuals living in a couple by applying the collective model by Chiappori (1988, 
1992) to a recreational setting through revealed preference data from a travel cost 
survey. In particular, by using the individual travel cost of the respondent and his/her 
household members we have estimated a collective AIDS demand system that takes 
into account the intra-household resource allocation. This allowed us to estimate the 
Willingness-To-Pay of the respondent and his/her spouse to access the West Garda 
Regional Forest in Italy. We defined the implemented method as ‘Collective Travel 
Cost Method’ (CTCM).  
We found that the traditional TCM overestimates the WTP of the respondent 
estimated by the CTCM and that the difference is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Then we found that respondent and his/her spouse have different WTP to access 
the recreational site. This seems implying that the actual practice of picking an adult 
at random from the household as representative of the other family member 
preferences could not be justified and that differences in how resources are distributed 
within households reflect appreciable differences in the welfare measures. 
Finally, we compare the respondent’s mean WTP from the TCM with the 
respondent’s mean WTP from a Contingent Valuation survey on the same sample of 
individuals. In line with the literature, we find that the two methods yield to 
statistically different results but the difference is smaller by using the CTCM rather 
than the traditional TCM. 
In conclusion, this chapter showed that the Collective Travel Cost Method 
developed in this study can be implemented to yield individual welfare estimates 
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potentially very useful for policy analysis but the need for more appropriately 
designed surveys must be emphasized. In the future, nonmarket valuation researchers 
should aspire to apply the Collective Travel Cost Method with improved data that 
include more observations and information about the number of trips and the 
demographic characteristics of the respondent’s spouse. By designing ad hoc 
questionnaires analysts may be able to provide policy makers with more efficient and 
accurate estimates of the value o public goods for each household member.  
From a theoretical perspective, two assumptions should be relaxed in the 
future: first, the assumption that the utility function of the spouse refers to the joint 
utility function of the spouse and his/her children; and second that the model does not 
take into account the behavior of groups where individuals from different households 
choose to take a trip together. Relaxing these assumptions will be the subject of 
forthcoming research.  
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Appendix: Generalized Heckman procedure 
The generalized Heckman procedure consists of transforming the censored equations 
into uncensored equations by using the appropriate correction. Following Arias et al. 
(2003), we consider the unconditional mean: 
[ ] [ ] ( , )| | 0
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i i i i i i
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where, φ and Φ are respectively the probability density function and the cumulative 
density function of a standard normal distribution, yi is the endogenous variable 
corresponding to the i-th equation in the censored system, xi is a vector of explanatory 
variables, βi is a vector of parameters. Using the expression for the unconditional 
expected value of each endogenous variable we consider the following system of 
uncensored equations: 
( , ) ( , )
( , )  i i i i i ii i i i i
i i
f x f x
y f x
β β
iβ σ φ ξσ σ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= Φ +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
+  
where [ ]|it it i ity E y xξ = − . This system can be estimated by limited maximum likelihood 
assuming that 
~ (0,MVN )ξ Ω  
where, ξ is a random vector whose i-th element is ξi. An important detail stressed by 
Arias et al. (2003) is that this is a straightforward maximum likelihood estimation 
since the latter system does not contain any censored equation. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Detecting Starting Point Bias in 
Dichotomous-Choice Contingent Valuation Surveys 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Many recent high-quality Contingent Valuation surveys elicit information about 
Willingness-To-Pay (WTP) by asking dichotomous-choice (DC) questions.35 
Respondents are asked whether or not they would buy the good if its cost was $X, or 
whether they would vote in favor or against the proposed public program in a 
referendum on a ballot if implementing it costs $X to the household, usually in the 
form of higher taxes. In this way, the respondent’s exact WTP amount is not directly 
observed, and all we do know is whether it is greater than the bid amount (‘yes’) or 
less than the bid amount (‘no’). 
To refine information about WTP, it is possible to ask a dichotomous choice 
follow-up question (Hanemann et al., 1991). Specifically, respondents who answer 
‘yes’ (‘no’) to the initial payment question are asked whether they would be willing to 
pay if the cost was $Y, where Y>X (Y<X). The responses to the initial and follow-up 
questions are combined to form narrower intervals around the respondent’s WTP, 
improving the efficiency of the estimates of WTP (Hanemann et al., 1991). Implicit in 
this approach—commonly dubbed ‘double-bounded’ (DB)—is the assumption that an 
                                                 
35 Contingent valuation is a frequently used approach for placing a value on goods that are not traded in 
markets. Prominent examples of these goods include improvements in environmental quality, other 
public goods, ecosystem health, and risks to human health. In a Contingent Valuation study, 
individuals are asked to report information about their Willingness-To-Pay to obtain (or to avoid the 
loss of) the good to be valued. The good is specified in a hypothetical scenario, and no actual 
transaction takes place.  
 individual’s responses to the initial and follow-up dichotomous-choice payment 
question are driven by the same WTP amount, which remains unobserved. WTP 
amounts are drawn from a distribution over the population and vary across 
individuals. 
Although many Contingent Valuation (CV) practitioners continue to 
implement surveys with dichotomous choice questions and follow-ups, and to fit 
double-bounded models, over the last decade researchers have examined this 
approach’s potential for undesirable response effects (see Section 3.2).  
In this chapter, we focus on one such effect, namely starting point bias. It is 
possible that when follow-up questions are used, respondents may ‘anchor’ the value 
they place on the policy on the bid amounts proposed to them in the initial and/or 
subsequent payment questions. The latter problem is usually termed ‘starting-point 
bias’ and a possible mechanism for it within a dichotomous-choice format is proposed 
by Herriges and Shogren (1996).36 Specifically, Herriges and Shogren formulate a 
model where the WTP amount driving the response to the follow-up payment 
question is a weighted average of the first latent WTP and the initial bids. Variants on 
Herriges and Shogren include Aprahamian et al. (2004), who treat the anchoring 
parameter as a random coefficient drawn from a specified distribution, and Lechner et 
al. (2003), who assume that even the first WTP amount of the respondent is 
influenced by the initial bid. Most recently, the Herriges and Shogren mechanism has 
been combined with yea-saying by Chien et al. (2005), who represent the latter using 
                                                 
36 Starting point bias was suspected to affect responses to iterative bidding CV payment questions, 
which were first introduced by Randall et al. (1974). Boyle et al. (1985), for example, include the 
initial bid amount in the right-hand side of their WTP equation, where the dependent variable is the 
final WTP amount announced by the respondent. A significant coefficient on the initial bid variable is 
interpreted as evidence of starting point bias.  
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 an additional error term that follows the half-normal distribution and is folded with 
the regular econometric error into a compound distribution.37  
In empirical work, it is common to test for the presence of starting point bias 
by (i) including in the right-hand side of the double-bounded model dummy variables 
for the bid set assigned to the respondent, and then (ii) testing the null hypothesis that 
the coefficients on these dummies are jointly equal to zero (Whittington et al., 1990; 
Green and Tunstall, 1991; Cameron and Quiggin, 1994, and most recently Chien et 
al., 2005).  
In this chapter, we examine four related issues pertaining to starting point bias. 
First, how serious are the biases of the location and scale parameters of WTP if 
starting point bias is present but ignored in the statistical model of the WTP 
responses? Second, what is the performance (measured in terms of nominal size and 
power) of the above mentioned diagnostic of starting point bias, namely the test on 
the coefficients on the bid set dummies? Third, how are the bias of the estimates and 
the performance of the diagnostic test affected when the distribution of WTP is 
misspecified? Fourth, how important is the bid design in all of the above?  
To elaborate on the third question, we suspect that in some cases what has 
been interpreted by the researcher as evidence of anchoring to the initial bids is 
simply an artifact due to misspecification of the econometric model and/or the poor 
choice of distribution of WTP. In the case of the diagnostic test based on the use of 
bid set dummies, we suspect that the coefficients on these dummies may act as 
available free parameters, and absorb the effects of misspecifications of the 
                                                 
37 See Johnson et al. (1994) for details about the half-normal distribution. 
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 econometric model or of the distribution of WTP, even though no starting point bias 
is present. 
Because starting point bias cannot be separately identified in any reliable 
manner from biases caused by model specification, we use simulation approaches to 
address this issue. Hence, we conduct a series of Monte Carlo simulations to answer 
these questions. We generate the latent WTP amounts from various distributions using 
two alternative starting point bias mechanisms, and model the responses using double-
bounded models, which ignore starting point bias.  
Our simulations suggest that the effect of ignoring starting point bias is 
complex, and depends on the true distribution of WTP and on the WTP statistic being 
estimated (mean WTP or the variance of WTP). We find that bid set dummies, which 
are used by many researchers to detect starting point bias, have only very modest 
power in detecting starting point bias. We find that the coefficients on these dummies 
tend to soak up misspecifications in the distribution assumed by the researcher for the 
latent WTP, so that the diagnostic test rejects the null too frequently, falsely pointing 
to starting point bias when the real problem is a poor distributional assumption.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses 
undesirable response effects that are possible when follow-up questions are used. In 
Section 3.3 we present the starting point bias mechanism developed by Herriges and 
Shogren (1996) and a plausible variant on this model. In Section 3.4, we present a 
commonly used test for the presence of starting point bias. We present the simulation 
study design in Section 3.5, and its results in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 concludes.  
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 3.2 Possible Response Biases in Double-Bounded Models 
Cameron and Quiggin (1994) relax the assumption that the response to the initial and 
follow-up payments are driven by the same amount. They estimate alternative models 
that assume distinct, but correlated, WTP amounts for each DC payment question. To 
detect the presence of starting point bias they include dummy variables for the initial 
bids, concluding that constraining the distributional parameters to be identical and the 
correlation to be unity exacerbates starting point effects. 
Alberini et al. (1997) apply a random effects model to DB Contingent 
Valuation data allowing for differing mean WTP across the initial and follow-up 
questions because respondents may become ‘confused about how much they will have 
to pay or what they will actually get’ (p. 311) as the survey proceeds. They reason that 
follow-up questions may induce respondents to effectively substitute the program or 
policy described in the scenario with another program or policy package that has 
different characteristics, and to form a new, systematically different WTP value that 
reflects the attributes of the new program. Using data from the San Joaquin Valley 
wetlands study (Hanemann et al., 1991), the study on the Kakadu Conservation Zone 
in Australia (Carson et al., 1994) and the Alaska survey to estimate the loss of 
passive-use values for Prince William sound resulting from the Exxon-Valdez oil spill 
of 1989 (Carson et al., 1992), they find that follow-up questions resulted in a 
systematic downward shift in median WTP in the Alaska study, while in the other 
studies the structural shift is negative but not statistically significant at the 
conventional levels.  
DeShazo (2002) considers alternative mental models—such as prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, and Tversky and Kahneman, 1991), which implies 
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 forming a reference point—and starting point bias, and predicts the probability of 
‘yes’/‘no’ responses to the follow-up questions implied by these models. For example, 
prospect theory implies that the probability of a respondent answering ‘yes’ to a 
follow-up question from an ascending sequence is less than the probability of a 
respondent answering ‘yes’ to the same value presented in an initial valuation 
question. By contrast, if anchoring occurs, respondents who are assigned the 
ascending sequence will anchor on the lower value, while respondents who are 
assigned the descending sequence will anchor on the higher value. (By ascending 
sequence, we mean a follow-up dollar amount that is greater than the initial bid 
because the respondent answered ‘yes’ to the first payment question. The term 
‘descending sequence’ refers to the opposite situation.)  
Carson et al. (2000) examine response effects that result in violations of the 
assumption that the responses to all payment questions are driven by the same WTP 
amount. Respondents, Carson et al. argue, may (i) take the second price as the 
expected price but consider the cost of the program to be somewhat uncertain, (ii) 
take a weighted average between the two prices, (iii) adjust the quantity of the good to 
match the change in price,38 or (iv) enter in a bargaining mode. Burton et al. (2003) 
use experiments to empirically discriminate between hypotheses (i) and (ii). 
 
                                                 
38 Evidence from focus groups suggests that people that answer ‘yes’ to the initial payment question 
expect the government to be capable of providing the public program at the cost stated to them in the 
initial question. Higher cost amounts, therefore, are sometimes interpreted to imply government waste. 
Likewise, people who initially answered ‘no’ may suspect that in the follow-up question the public 
program being valued is a scaled down version of the initially described program. 
 92
 3.3 Models of Starting Point Bias 
Dichotomous-choice Contingent Valuation assumes that the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ responses to 
the payment questions are determined by comparing the respondent’s stated WTP 
amount with the bids assigned to him. In DC CV surveys with a DC follow-up 
question, the responses to the payment questions are used to construct an interval 
around each respondent’s unobserved WTP amount. Assuming, for example, that 
respondent i’s WTP is normally distributed with mean  and variance , this 
respondent’s contribution to the likelihood function is: 
βx i
2σ
U L
i i i iWTP WTP
σ σ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛−Φ − Φ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎝ ⎠ ⎝
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β x β ,  (3.1) 
where  and  are the lower and upper bound, respectively, of the interval 
around the respondent’s unobserved true WTP amount. 
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  (3.2) 
and the parameters are estimated by the method of maximum likelihood.39  
If starting point bias is present, the bid amounts may influence the response to 
a payment question in two ways: (i) by affecting underlying WTP directly if 
respondents use the bid information to update their true WTP, and (ii) through the 
comparison between WTP (which is already affected by the bid) and the bid. 
 
39 This log likelihood function is easily amended to accommodate for other distributions. See, for 
example, Alberini, et al. (2006). 
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 Herriges and Shogren (1996) propose the following mechanism for starting 
point bias. Assume that when first faced with a dichotomous-choice question, an 
individual compares the initial bid, B1, with his WTP amount, WTP1i. The latter is a 
draw from the population distribution of WTP, and the answer to the payment 
question is ‘yes’ (‘in favor’) if WTP1i exceeds B1, and ‘no’ (‘against’) otherwise. 
Now suppose that the individual is asked a dichotomous-choice follow-up 
question where he is queried about B2. Herriges and Shogren argue that the initial bid 
may provide a ‘focal point or anchor for the uncertain respondent.’40 This may 
happen when the uncertain respondent interprets the bid amount as an approximation 
of the good’s true value, thus anchoring his or her WTP on the proposed bid to update 
priors in light of society’s or experts’ beliefs. They further propose that the response 
to the second payment question is driven by a different amount, WTP2i, which is a 
weighted average of WTP1i and the initial bid, B1. Formally,  
iiWTP εμ +=1 ,  (3.3) 
where μ is mean WTP and ε is (normally distributed) error term with variance , 
and  
2σ
112 )1( BWTPWTP ii ⋅+−= γγ ,  .4) 
                                                
(3
where 0 ≤ γ≤ 1 is the weight placed on the initial bid. (Clearly, this notation assumes 
that mean WTP is the same for all respondents. This common mean replaces the 
individual-specific expectation  used in equations (3.1) and (3.2).) βx i
 
40 Accordingly, in this chapter the terms ‘starting point bias’ and ‘anchoring’ are used interchangeably. 
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  If γ=0, there is no anchoring, and ii WTPWTP 12 = , as is routinely assumed in 
double-bounded models. If γ=1, no memory of the original WTP amount is retained in 
the follow-up question, and  is equal to the first bid amount. iWTP2
Conventional double-bounded models of WTP assume that the responses to 
both the initial and the follow-up payment questions are driven by the same 
underlying WTP amount, and are thus misspecified in this situation. Herriges and 
Shogren show that the anchoring mechanism described by equations (3.3) and (3.4) 
effectively widens the boundaries placed on WTP by the follow-up question. The 
greater the weight γ, the wider these boundaries, and the less information about the 
original WTP is contained in response to the follow-up payment question. In addition, 
with this anchoring mechanism the WTP amount driving the response to the follow-
up payment question has, by construction, a smaller variance than the original WTP, 
.  1WTP
If one fits a conventional double-bounded model in this situation, are the 
estimated coefficients biased, and, if so, how severely? Herriges and Shogren conduct 
simulations, showing that in the presence of starting point bias the estimates of mean 
WTP, μ, are unbiased, but σ, the standard deviation of WTP, is systematically 
underestimated.41 They point out that ‘The starting point bias squeezes the 
distribution tightly around the mean, but does not bias the estimated mean WTP’ 
(Herriges and Shogren, 1996, p. 121).  
Their first claim follows from the fact that multiplying WTP1 by (1-γ) shrinks 
the variance, a reduction that cannot be offset by the addition of B1. (If WTP follows 
                                                 
41 By contrast, in the presence of omitted starting point bias the one-way up and the one-way down 
approaches produce biased estimates of both mean WTP and the standard deviation of WTP. 
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 the normal or any other distribution defined between -∞, or 0 and ∞, the bids will 
usually cover a much smaller range.) Their second claim rests on the fact that in their 
study (i) the distribution of WTP is symmetric, and (ii) the average of the bid amounts 
is about equal to mean WTP. Their anchoring mechanism implies that individuals 
simply compute a weighted average of WTP1 and B1, so if the average initial bid is 
roughly equal to mean WTP1, mean WTP2 is roughly equal to mean WTP1, and so is 
the weighted average of these two means, which the double-bounded estimator tends 
to.  
Based on these considerations, we would expect conventional double-bounded 
models to produce biased estimates of WTP if the average of the initial bids is 
different from mean WTP. We would also expect them to underestimate the variance 
of WTP, since they will tend to capture an average of the variances of WTP1 and 
WTP2, and the latter is less than the former. Because the variance of WTP enters in 
the computation of the standard errors around the estimate of mean WTP, this has 
potentially important implications for statistical inference about WTP and its use in 
policy contexts.  
In this chapter, we generate data following the Herriges and Shogren 
mechanism, but we estimate double-bounded models (which ignore the presence of 
anchoring), and examine the consequences of doing so on the estimates of mean WTP 
and variance of WTP. Our work differs from earlier studies in that (i) when using the 
Herriges-Shogren approach, we consider WTP distributions other than the normal, (ii) 
we examine the effects of using different bid sets, and (iii) we check the size and 
power of a commonly used diagnostic test for anchoring.  
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 In addition, (iv), we study (ii) and (iii) after introducing an amendment to the 
Herriges and Shogren that, in our opinion, reflects a realistic response effect induced 
by the follow-up payment question. We reason that while respondents might treat the 
initial bid as providing information about the value of the policy—as suggested by 
Herriges and Shogren—the follow-up question may end up confusing them. In 
practice, this is one possible representation for the uncertainty about the cost of the 
program effect discussed in Carson et al. (2000). We therefore amend equation (3.4) 
to obtain  
iii eBWTPWTP +⋅+−= 112 )1( γγ ,  (3.5) 
where the error term ei captures the possible uncertainty/confusion associated with the 
follow-up question. 
 
3.4 Detecting Starting Point Bias 
Whittington et al. (1991), Green and Tunstall (1991), Cameron and Quiggin 
(1994) and Chien et al. (2005) include bid set dummies among the regressors of the 
double-bounded model to capture starting point effects.42 This approach is an 
extension to dichotomous-data model of an approach previously used with WTP 
responses on a continuous scale elicited through open-ended questions (Boyle et 
al.,1985). 
Letting δ be the vector of coefficients on the bid set dummies, one tests the 
null hypothesis that δ=0 (no anchoring) against the alternative that at least one of the 
                                                 
42 By bid set dummies, we mean a set of dummies where the first takes on a value of one if the 
respondent was assigned to the first bid set used in the survey and 0 otherwise, etc. 
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 elements in δ is different from 0. Rejection of the null is interpreted as evidence of 
starting point bias. Because the parameters of the model are estimated using the 
method of maximum likelihood, any one of the three classical tests—the Wald, 
likelihood ratio, or score test—can be used. Under relatively mild regularity 
assumptions, under the null the three statistics are each distributed as a chi square 
with m=dim(δ) degrees of freedom, and are thus asymptotically equivalent.  
In this chapter, we use the Wald statistic, which is calculated as 
δVδ ˆˆ 1−′=w ,  (3.6) 
where  is the vector of coefficients on the bid set dummies estimated from the 
augmented double-bounded model, and V is the block of the information matrix for 
all parameters corresponding to the coefficients on the bid set dummies. V is, 
therefore, an m×m matrix. As mentioned, for large sample size and under the null, the 
test statistic w is distributed as a chi square with m degrees of freedom. Failure to 
reject the null implies that there is no evidence of anchoring on the bid amounts.  
δˆ
 
3.5 Study Design 
 To answer our research questions, we conducted a series of Monte Carlo 
simulations. We ran a total of four sets of simulations. Each simulation set is 
comprised of 15 experiments (5 values of γ × 3 bid designs).43 In each experiment, the 
number of replications is 1000 and in each replication the sample size is 1000. Our 
study design is summarized in Table 3.1. 
                                                 
43 In simulation set II, we have a total of 30 experiments, because we also change the variance of one of 
the error terms in the model. See Table 3.1. 
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 Table 3.1 - Summary of the Simulation Experiment Design 
(A) 
Simulation set 
(B) 
True WTP 
distribution 
(C) 
Parameters of 
true WTP distribution 
(D) 
Anchoring mechanism 
(E) 
Bid sets 
I Normal 
μ=10  
σ=10 
Herriges and Shogren 
with γ=0 (no anchoring), 
0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 
--base  
--upper tail 
--lower tail  
II Normal 
μ=10 
σ1=10 
 
σ2=3 or 20 
 
Anchoring + error term 
with γ=0 (no anchoring), 
0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 
--base  
--upper tail 
--lower tail 
III Weibull 
Scale parameter σ=10 
Shape parameter θ=1 
Herriges and Shogren 
with γ=0 (no anchoring), 
0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 
--base  
--upper tail 
--lower tail 
IV Lognormal 
μ=1.956012 (mean of log 
WTP) 
σ=0.693147 (standard 
deviation of log WTP) 
Herriges and Shogren 
with γ=0 (no anchoring), 
0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 
--base  
--upper tail 
--lower tail 
 
We generate draws from the assumed distribution, shown in column (B) of 
Table 3.1. Each draw is assigned at random to one of the possible bid sets (reported in 
Table 3.3), and binary indicators corresponding to ‘yes’ or ‘no’ responses to the 
payment questions are created by comparing the draw with its assigned bid value and 
appropriate follow-up bid amount.  
All simulations fit normal likelihood function, but we assume different 
distributions (normal, Weibull, and lognormal) for true WTP in different simulation 
sets. Simulation sets I, III and IV adopt the Herriges-Shogren anchoring mechanism 
(equations (3.1) and (3.4)). By contrast, in simulation set II we use our amendment to 
the Herriges-Shogren model (equation (3.5)), but assume that true distribution is 
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 normal, so that we can compare the results of these runs with those of simulation set I. 
In simulation set II, we assume that ε and e are uncorrelated; however, it is easily 
shown that WTP1 and WTP2 are correlated, since they both contain ε. In sum, WTP1 
and WTP2 are jointly normally distributed. 
Simulation set II is repeated under two alternative values for 2σ , where 
, namely 3 and 20, where the latter signifies a situation where respondent 
confusion is more pronounced.  
)(22 eVar=σ
To make all simulation sets comparable as we vary the distribution of WTP, 
we choose the parameters of the distribution of WTP so that its expected value (mean 
WTP) is 10 and its variance 100.44  
We use a total of three bid sets. Each is comprised of 5 initial bid amounts and 
their corresponding high and low follow-up bids. As before, it is important that the 
bid amounts be comparable across different WTP distributions, so we choose our bid 
sets to correspond to specified percentiles of the distribution of WTP, as shown in 
Table 3.2. (This means that the actual bid amounts differ across simulation sets to 
mirror the different distributions we assume for WTP. We remind the reader that the 
percentile is 1 minus the probability of answering ‘yes’ to that bid amount.)  
                                                 
44 If Y denotes a Weibull random variate, its cdf is 1 exp ( / )y θσ− −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , its mean is (1/ 1)σ θ⋅ Γ + , and 
its median is 1/[ ln 0.5] θσ − . If Y is a lognormal, the density is 
2
1 1 ln
exp
22
y
y
μ
σσ π
−−
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎛ ⎞⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
, mean 
is 2exp(0.5 )σ μ+  and median is exp(μ). 
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 Table 3.2 - Percentiles Corresponding to the Bid Amounts in the Simulations 
Design Percentile 
Base Design 0.184 0.310 0.500 0.580 0.692 
Upper Tail Design 0.184 0.310 0.500 0.692 0.933 
Lower Tail Design 0.184 0.242 0.274 0.310 0.382 
 
Table 3.3 - Initial Bid Amounts 
Distribution Bid Design 1
st  
Initial Bid 
2nd  
Initial Bid 
3rd  
Initial Bid 
4th  
Initial Bid 
5th 
Initial Bid 
Base 1 5 10 12 15 
Upper tail 1 5 10 15 25 Normal  
Lower tail 1 3 4 5 7 
Base 2.034 3.689 6.931 8.657 11.759 
Upper tail 2.034 3.689 6.931 11.759 27.059 Weibull  
Lower tail 2.034 2.770 3.206 3.689 4.814 
Base 3.342 4.663 7.071 8.352 10.722 
Upper tail 3.342 4.663 7.071 10.723 24.652 Lognormal  
Lower tail 3.342 3.948 4.291 4.663 5.508 
 
The artificial draws from the WTP distribution are evenly divided among the 
five possible bid sets. In the base bid set, the initial bid values cover the 18th-69th 
percentile. The bid set labeled ‘upper tail’ covers the 18th to 93th percentiles, while 
the bid set labeled ‘lower tail’ is skewed towards the lower tail of the distribution of 
WTP and fails to cover the right tail of the distribution of WTP. When the distribution 
of WTP is a normal, the average of the initial bids for the base, upper tail, and lower 
tail designs is 8.6, 11.2 and 4, respectively. 
Earlier research (Alberini, 1995; Kanninen, 1991, and Cooper, 1993) shows 
that when the distribution of WTP is symmetric, an unbalanced bid design (i.e., one 
that places more bids and/or respondents on side of the distribution, or farther away 
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 from the mean) tends to result in inefficient, but unbiased, estimates of mean WTP.45 
However, with right-skewed distributions of WTP the estimate of mean WTP depends 
crucially on ‘nailing down’ the upper tail of distribution, a task that can be 
accomplished only by querying respondents about their Willingness-To-Pay relatively 
large bid amounts. At such large bid amounts, a large fraction of the respondents are 
expected to answer ‘no’ to the payment question.46 These considerations suggest that 
with right-skewed distributions we would expect the ‘upper tail’ design to perform 
best, and the ‘lower tail’ design to result in less efficient, and potentially unstable, 
estimates of mean WTP. The follow-up amounts are double or half of the initial 
amount.  
We use a total five values for γ, the anchoring parameter: 0, which means that 
there is no anchoring, then 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and 0.9, which imply levels of anchoring 
ranging from mild to severe. For each artificial data generation, we fit two double-
bounded interval-data likelihood functions, both of which assume that WTP is a 
normal variate. The first is the regular double-bounded model (with no individual 
characteristics), which is used to establish the seriousness of the biases (if any) of the 
estimates of mean and variance WTP. In the second double-bounded model, the 
likelihood function is amended to include dummies for the bid set.47 Since there are a 
                                                 
45 Efficiency goals with respect to estimating mean WTP are sometimes in conflict with doing a good 
job estimating the variance of WTP: a compromise can be reached when choosing the bid amounts, for 
example, by adopting the d-optimality design criterion (Kanninen, 1991). 
46 This is again a situation where statistical estimation needs may be in conflict with a realistic scenario. 
If the bid amount is perceived to be unrealistically large for the good described in the questionnaire, the 
respondent may question the credibility of the exercise and provide unreliable responses. 
47 For example, in simulation set I, when the base bid design is used, the bid set dummies are A1=1 if 
the initial bid is 1, and 0 otherwise; A2=1 if the initial bid assigned to this observation is 5, and 0 
otherwise, etc. 
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 total of five bid sets, we include four bid set dummies, and we compute the Wald 
statistics for the null that the coefficients on the bid dummies are all equal to zero.  
 
3.6 Results 
We use two criteria to examine the performance of double-bounded models in 
the presence of starting point bias. The first is the relative bias of mean WTP, and the 
second is the relative bias of the standard deviation of WTP, σ(WTP). The relative 
bias is the bias divided by the true value of the WTP statistic. Regarding the 
diagnostic test, i.e., the Wald test of the null that the coefficients of the bid dummies 
are jointly equal to zero, we examine the percentage of times that the test rejects the 
null hypothesis for a given significance level. Clearly, if γ=0, this percentage is the 
empirical size of the test, i.e., the frequency with which the null is falsely rejected. If γ 
is different from zero, this percentage is the empirical power of the test. We expect 
the power of the test to increase with γ. We do not have any prior expectation of the 
empirical size of the test when there is no starting point bias and the true WTP 
distribution is not normal (but the likelihood function assumes that it is). 
 
3.6.1  Bias of the Welfare Estimates 
Table 3.4 displays the relative bias of mean WTP for the three bid designs and the 
four simulation sets.  
Panel (a) refers to the situation where true WTP is normal and one fits the 
double-bounded model that assumes a normal distribution (and ignores the presence 
of starting point bias). When there is no starting point bias (i.e., γ=0), this is the 
correct model, and the estimates of mean WTP are virtually unbiased. The relative 
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 bias—which is computed as the average mean WTP over the replications minus the 
true mean WTP, and then divided by the true mean WTP—is only -0.20 to -0.18%. 
With the base bid design, the bias of mean WTP does not change much, even when 
anchoring is more pronounced (-1.50% for γ=0.3 to -7% for γ=0.9).  
The upper tail design does not fare as well, but the biases resulting from this 
design never exceed 15% of the true mean WTP. It is interesting that—against our 
expectations—the bias is non-monotonic in γ. The lower tail design is the worst of the 
three. Even a moderate degree of anchoring produces a bias of -16%, and extreme 
anchoring (γ=0.9) results in an underestimate of mean WTP by at least 50%. 
Panel (b) displays the results when we use our amendment to the Herriges-
Shogren model when the variance of the error term in the follow-up question is small. 
Clearly, the results are very similar to those of panel (a) because the variance of the 
additional error term is too small to offset the variance shrinkage due to the anchoring 
on the first bid. As shown in panel (c), the biases are of similar magnitude (but 
slightly smaller) when the variance of the additional error term is larger.  
Panel (d) shows that assuming the wrong distribution results in biased 
estimates of mean WTP. What’s interesting is that the bias of mean WTP varies with 
the bid design used, but for a given bid design does not vary with the severity of the 
anchoring. This is a somewhat surprising result. As we expected, the design that fares 
the best is the upper tail design, which underestimates mean WTP by about 16%. This 
design barely outperforms the base design, which on average underestimates mean 
WTP by 19%. The worst is the lower tail design, which underestimates mean WTP by 
about 30%. Panel (e) shows similar effects of fitting a normal double-bounded model 
to lognormal WTP data in the presence of varying degrees of anchoring. 
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 Table 3.5 presents similar summary statistics of the simulations for the 
standard deviation of WTP, σ(WTP). Panel (a) shows that the double-bounded model 
underestimates true σ(WTP), an effect that becomes more pronounced as anchoring 
becomes stronger. As before, the best behaved design is the base design. The one that 
results in the most severe biases is the lower tail design, which underestimates true 
σ(WTP) by up to 76% for γ=0.9. Panel (b) shows similar biases when only a small 
error term is added to the anchoring mechanism. As shown in panel (c), the biases are 
reduced somewhat when the variance of the error term in equation (3.5) is larger, thus 
partially offsetting the shrinkage of WTP due to the anchoring.   
Panels (d) and (e) confirm that when the wrong distribution is used, and 
anchoring is present but ignored, the estimates of σ(WTP) are biased. As before, the 
biases depend on the bid design, but for a given bid design they do not depend on the 
severity of the anchoring. The biases can be very pronounced: in our examples, the 
true σ(WTP) may be underestimated by over 50%. 
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 Table 3.4 – Percent Bias Mean WTP 
  
Anchoring
Level 
(γ) 
Base Bid 
Design 
Upper Tail 
Bid Design 
Lower Tail 
Bid Design 
a) 0 -0.20 -0.10 0.18
True WTP: Normal Distribution  0.3 -1.50 6.54 -16.20
Likelihood Function: Normal 0.5 -1.72 12.85 -27.22
(Simulation Set I - Herriges-Shogren’s Model) 0.7 -1.74 14.89 -39.30
  0.9 -7.00 7.98 -49.70
b) 0 -0.02 -0.12 -0.15
True WTP: Normal Distribution  0.3 -2.03 5.22 -17.23
Likelihood Function: Normal 0.5 -3.23 10.21 -27.30
Sigma 2 = 3 0.7 -4.49 12.08 -37.57
(Simulation Set II) 0.9 -7.80 7.60 -46.73
c) 0 -0.02 -0.12 -0.15
True WTP: Normal Distribution  0.3 0.69 3.13 -27.60
Likelihood Function: Normal 0.5 -0.50 3.84 -30.66
Sigma 2 = 20 0.7 -1.73 4.20 -33.57
(Simulation Set II) 0.9 -2.96 4.80 -36.02
d) 0 -19.03 -16.64 -30.73
True WTP: Weibull Distribution  0.3 -18.99 -16.71 -30.62
Likelihood Function: Normal 0.5 -18.78 -16.68 -30.74
(Simulation Set III) 0.7 -19.94 -16.72 -30.83
  0.9 -19.12 -16.86 -30.67
e) 0 -17.32 -15.45 -24.68
True WTP: Weibull Distribution  0.3 -17.31 -15.49 -24.60
Likelihood Function: Normal 0.5 -17.40 -15.43 -24.71
(Simulation Set IV) 0.7 -17.43 -15.50 -24.67
  0.9 -17.44 -15.62 -24.64
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 Table 3.5 – Percent Bias Std. Dev. WTP 
 
Anchoring
Level 
(γ) 
Base Bid 
Design 
Upper Tail 
Bid Design 
Lower 
Tail Bid 
Design 
a) 0 0.01 -0.01 0.31 
True WTP: Normal Distribution  0.3 -24.20 -17.81 -27.37 
Likelihood Function: Normal 0.5 -38.78 -28.13 -45.68 
(Simulation Set I - Herriges-Shogren’s Model) 0.7 -49.65 -36.52 -64.62 
  0.9 -51.60 -38.68 -76.79 
b) 0 0.05 -0.01 0.04 
True WTP: Normal Distribution  0.3 -20.80 -15.81 -27.78 
Likelihood Function: Normal 0.5 -34.32 -25.06 -43.36 
Sigma 2 = 3 0.7 -44.11 -31.88 -57.91 
(Simulation Set II) 0.9 -48.10 -35.13 -68.92 
c) 0 0.05 -0.01 0.04 
True WTP: Normal Distribution  0.3 2.30 1.51 -38.77 
Likelihood Function: Normal 0.5 -2.70 -2.65 -42.58 
Sigma 2 = 20 0.7 -7.57 -6.40 -46.08 
(Simulation Set II) 0.9 -11.84 -9.59 -49.22 
d) 0 -13.57 -6.19 -45.64 
True WTP: Weibull Distribution  0.3 -13.82 -6.24 -45.52 
Likelihood Function: Normal 0.5 -13.45 -6.04 -45.46 
(Simulation Set III) 0.7 -13.55 -6.10 -45.62 
  0.9 -13.68 -6.67 -45.57 
e) 0 -35.32 -26.24 -56.50 
True WTP: Weibull Distribution  0.3 -35.28 -26.61 -56.54 
Likelihood Function: Normal 0.5 -35.18 -26.42 -56.53 
(Simulation Set IV) 0.7 -35.50 -26.55 -56.54 
 0.9 -35.32 -26.69 -56.41 
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 3.6.2 Diagnostic test 
Table 3.6 summarizes the relative frequencies of rejection of the null hypothesis that 
the bid set dummies are jointly equal to zero for all experiments and simulations sets. 
The table was constructed assuming that the significance level (or nominal size of the 
test) is α=0.05.  
Table 3.6 shows clearly that in simulation set I, where the correct distribution 
(the normal) is assumed for WTP, and no anchoring is present (γ=0), the percentage 
of rejections of the null is similar to the nominal size of the test, although it slightly 
exceeds it if the upper tail bid design is used. We had expected the relative frequency 
of rejections to increase with γ, but this expectation is not borne out in the results: 
rejections occur in 5-6 percent of the replications, regardless of the value of γ, and do 
not appear to depend in any predictable way on the bid design. We believe that this is 
due to the fact that the estimate of μ adjusts accordingly. We did not detect any 
particular patterns in the estimated coefficients on the bid dummies. 
The results are similar when we introduce an error term to capture respondent 
confusion, as we do in simulation set II. Changing the variance of this term does not 
change much the percentage of rejections.  
In simulation set III, the true distribution is a Weibull, but we fit a normal 
double-bounded model and ignore anchoring. If anchoring is absent (γ=0), the relative 
frequency of the rejections does vary with the bid design used, and ranges from 11 to 
26%. This means that the diagnostic test must be picking up the effect of a poor 
distributional assumption. We note three interesting findings at this point. First, the 
most frequent rejections occur with the bid design that tracks the upper tail of the 
distribution. Second, the percentage of rejections is insensitive to the value of γ, the 
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 anchoring parameter, in the sense that they do not exhibit a clear trend as γ increases. 
Third, the power of the test when γ is greater than zero is rather modest, as it never 
exceeds 24%. 
Results for the lognormal distribution (simulation set IV) are qualitatively 
similar to those for the Weibull. When γ =0, the empirical size of the Wald test 
slightly exceeds the nominal size of the test for all designs, especially the upper tail 
and lower tail designs. In these cases, the empirical frequency of rejection of the null 
is 7-15 percent against a nominal size of 5 percent. Little change is seen when γ 
increases for a given bid design. We conclude that in this simulation set the Wald test 
exhibited limited power in picking up either anchoring or the poor distributional 
assumption. 
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 Table 3.6. Empirical Size and Power of the Test of Starting Point Bias 
DGP Anchoring Present? 
DB 
Log 
Likelihood 
Percent 
Rejection of 
Null 
Wald Test 
(Base Bid Set) 
Percent 
Rejection of  
Null 
Wald Test 
(Upper Tail 
Bid Set) 
Percent 
Rejection of  
Null 
Wald Test 
(Lower Tail  
Bid Set) 
No 5.50 4.70 7.51 
Yes, γ = 0.3 6.00 5.80 5.53 
Yes, γ = 0.5 5.90 6.70 5.68 
Yes, γ = 0.7 3.40 6.90 4.47 
Normal 
(Simulation Set I) 
Yes, γ = 0.9 
Normal 
4.70 6.40 5.82 
No 5.11 7.26 6.06 
Yes, γ = 0.3 6.30 7.66 3.31 
Yes, γ = 0.5 4.02 2.47 6.20 
Yes, γ = 0.7 7.80 3.69 5.56 
Normal 
(σ2 = 3) 
(Simulation Set II) 
Yes, γ = 0.9 
Normal 
6.69 6.45 4.66 
No 5.11 7.26 6.06 
Yes, γ = 0.3 5.70 6.27 5.74 
Yes, γ = 0.5 5.20 5.27 6.38 
Yes, γ = 0.7 5.50 5.90 4.21 
Normal 
(σ2 = 20) 
(Simulation Set II) 
Yes, γ = 0.9 
Normal 
5.80 4.97 6.29 
No 10.88 26.04 13.65 
Yes, γ = 0.3 13.29 21.80 12.78 
Yes, γ = 0.5 12.98 23.01 13.01 
Yes, γ = 0.7 12.18 23.57 14.13 
Weibull 
(Simulation Set III) 
Yes, γ = 0.9 
Normal 
13.31 21.92 12.77 
No 7.06 12.84 14.44 
Yes, γ = 0.3 7.43 12.23 13.02 
Yes, γ = 0.5 5.30 11.58 14.45 
Yes, γ = 0.7 8.17 10.97 16.30 
Lognormal 
(Simulation Set IV) 
Yes, γ = 0.9 
Normal 
5.78 15.37 15.82 
 
 
 110
 3.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have focused on starting point bias (anchoring) in the dichotomous 
choice Contingent Valuation surveys with a dichotomous choice follow-up question. 
We have considered a mechanism that generates anchoring first developed by 
Herriges and Shogren and frequently adopted in the literature, and have examined the 
effect of ignoring starting point bias and fitting double-bounded models.  
Our results suggest that normally distributed double-bounded models may 
produce biased estimates of mean WTP and the standard deviation of WTP when 
anchoring is present, that these biases are more severe the stronger the anchoring is, 
and that the severity of the biases varies with the bid design used. A well-balanced, 
symmetric bid design may result in very modest biases even when the anchoring 
mechanism is very strong. 
When the true WTP is not a normal variate, but a normal double-bounded 
model is estimated, the biases do not vary with the severity of the anchoring, and 
seem to depend primarily on the misspecification of the distribution. As before, the 
biases do depend on the bid design.  
We also investigated the empirical size and power of a commonly used test for 
detecting the presence of starting point bias. This test consists of including bid set 
dummies in the right-hand side of the double-bounded model, and of testing the null 
that all bid set coefficients are equal to zero. We used a Wald test to test this 
hypothesis, but the other two classical tests (the likelihood ratio and score test) can be 
used interchangeably, since they are asymptotically equivalent to the Wald test.  
We found that when the true distribution of WTP is a normal and the 
econometric model of the responses to the payment questions is a normal double-
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 bounded, the test has very little power against the alternative even when the anchoring 
parameter is very high. When the true distribution of WTP is a Weibull or a 
lognormal, but one fits a normal double-bounded model, depending on the bid design 
used, one may tend to reject the null hypothesis of no anchoring too frequently when 
anchoring is not present. The power of the Wald test is modest, and does not change 
much with the anchoring parameter γ. 
Based on our findings, we caution researchers that the consequences of 
starting point biases are complex and depend on the underlying distribution of WTP. 
We also caution them that simple to implement diagnostic tests, such as the inclusion 
of bid set dummies in the right-hand side of double-bounded models of WTP, may be 
misleading. We have found that tests of the null that the coefficients on these 
dummies are equal to zero may fail to reject the null when they should, or may tend to 
reject it even if no starting point bias is present, simply because the researcher did not 
use the correct distribution of WTP or the correct random utility model (RUM) in 
writing out the double-bounded models.  
Unfortunately, it is difficult to come up with alternative approaches for 
detecting and correcting for anchoring unless the correct distribution of WTP or the 
correct RUM model are assumed, and one is prepared to make specific assumptions 
about the form of the anchoring. Semi-parametric, semi-nonparametric, and 
nonparametric models (reviewed in Cooper, 2002), which alleviate the need for 
making assumptions regarding the distribution and/or the functional form of the 
RUM, cannot separately identify response biases from other forms of bias.  
In principle, one can compare the relative frequency of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ responses 
to the same bid amount in groups of respondents that were assigned different bid sets. 
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 If the probability of a yes to $X as a starting bid is statistically the same as a 
probability of a yes to $X in the follow-ups (after converting the follow-up probability 
from a conditional to an unconditional probability), then the null hypothesis that there 
is no response bias cannot be rejected. However, even if bias is present, this approach 
cannot identify its form nor know which bound is associated with the most severe bias 
in the responses: all we can surmise when using such an approach is that the 
responses to the bid values are not consistent across the bounds.  
In sum, unless one is prepared to make assumptions about the form of the bias, 
it cannot be corrected for. As we have suggested, without additional information 
beyond the responses to the bids themselves, econometric approaches to identifying 
and correcting for response bias do not appear to be fruitful. An alternative may be to 
use follow-up questions specifically pertaining to the respondent’s views on being 
asked follow-up questions. Another approach that we deem worth investigating is to 
openly tell respondents in advance that there will be multiple bids to respond to, and 
that multiple bid response questions will be asked simply to get a more precise 
assessment of Willingness-To-Pay. We believe that this is a potentially promising 
area for future research.  
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 Appendix 
Double-Bounded Models of WTP with Starting Point Bias 
 
A1. Model of the Responses Corresponding to Equations (3.3) and (3.4) 
( )211 0,NAssumption: ε σ   
Let 
WTP1: WTP to the first bid; 
WTP2: WTP to the follow-up bid; 
BB1 = first bid; 
BB
1 1
2 = follow-up bid; 
μ = mean WTP; 
σ1 = standard deviation of the first WTP variable; 
γ = gamma parameter indicating the anchoring; 
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 From (A.1) WTP2 becomes 
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Let dnn = 1 if the starting bid is BB1, B1B  > BB2 and the response is (No, No), and 0 
otherwise; let dyn = 1 if the starting bid is B1B , BB1 < B2B  and the response is (Yes, No); let 
dny = 1 if the starting bid is BB1, B1B  > BB2 and the response is (No, Yes), and 0 otherwise; 
and let dyy = 1 if the starting bid is B1B , BB1 < B2B  and the response is (Yes, Yes). 
The log-likelihood function becomes 
log ( , ) log ( , ) log ( , ) log ( , )log yy yn ny nnd P Yes Yes d P Yes No d P No Yes d P No NoL + + +∑= ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
 
 116
 A2. Model of the Responses Corresponding to Equations (3.3) and (3.5) 
Assumption: ( )  ( ) ( )21 1 2
2 21
0
,
0
N
ε σ
ε σ
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ 
12
2
σ
σ
Let 
WTP1: WTP to the first bid; 
WTP2: WTP to the follow-up bid; 
BB1 = first bid; 
BB2 = follow-up bid; 
μ = mean WTP; 
σ1 = standard deviation of the first WTP variable; 
σ2 = standard deviation of the error term that gets added to the function of WTP and 
first bid in the generation of WTP2
γ = gamma parameter indicating the anchoring; 
ω = standard deviation of new error term of WTP2 with anchoring; 
ω12 = covariance between new error term of WTP2 with anchoring and the error term 
of WTP1; 
σ12 = covariance between error term WTP1 and error term that gets added to the 
function of WTP and first bid in the generation of WTP2; 
ρ = correlation term between new error term of WTP2 with anchoring and the error 
term of WTP1; 
 
1 1*WTP W μ ε= = +  
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γ = 0: no anchoring: WTP2 = W* + ε2; 
γ = 1: WTP2 = B1 + ε2; 
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We denote the corresponding response probabilities as 
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 Let dnn = 1 if the starting bid is BB1, B1B  > BB2 and the response is (No, No), and 0 
otherwise; let dyn = 1 if the starting bid is B1B , BB1 < B2B  and the response is (Yes, No); let 
dny = 1 if the starting bid is BB1, B1B  > BB2 and the response is (No, Yes), and 0 otherwise; 
and let dyy = 1 if the starting bid is B1B , BB1 < B2B  and the response is (Yes, Yes). 
The log-likelihood function becomes 
log ( , ) log ( , ) log ( , ) log ( , )log yy yn ny nnd P Yes Yes d P Yes No d P No Yes d P No NoL + + +∑= ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
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 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
It has long been recognized that information about consumer preferences for 
nonmarket environmental resources or public goods can be revealed indirectly 
through travel decisions or can be elicited directly through Contingent Valuation 
techniques. The same set of preferences should be driving both travel behavior and 
Contingent Valuation responses. However, the nonmarket valuation literature shows 
that the Travel Cost Method and the Contingent Valuation Method yield to different 
WTP estimates. We argue that the TCM can reveal consumer preferences for non-
market goods only by capturing family behavior while instead the WTP is an 
individual based measure. 
The main goal of this research has been to show how to extend the traditional 
Travel Cost Method to a collective framework in order to estimate WTP for each 
household member by using only revealed preference data. This allowed us to make 
TCM and CVM estimates about Willingness-To-Pay comparable at the individual 
level.  
In Chapter 1 we developed a recreational demand model that uses information 
on singles to derive the recreational demand of individuals living in a couple. We 
showed that the recreational demand of individual i depends not only on individual i’s 
time cost but also on the time cost of the other household members, and that husbands 
and wives have significantly different recreational demands. This implies that 
observations for husbands and wives may not be treated as identical as in the 
traditional recreational demand model (unless one spouse is the dictator) and that the 
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 collective setting is a plausible next step to take in the analysis of recreational demand 
model. 
In Chapter 2 by using the individual travel cost of the respondent and his/her 
household members we estimated a collective Almost Ideal Demand System that 
takes into account the intra-household resource allocation. This allowed us to estimate 
the WTP of the respondent and his/her spouse to access a natural park. We defined the 
implemented method as the ‘Collective Travel Cost Method’ (CTCM). We found that 
the traditional unitary TCM overestimates the WTP of the respondent estimated by 
the CTCM and that the difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Then we 
found that respondent and his/her spouse have different WTP to access the 
recreational site. This implies that the actual practice of picking an adult at random 
from the household as representative of the other family members’ preferences could 
not be justified.  
Finally, we compared the respondent’s mean WTP from the TCM with the 
respondent’s mean WTP from a Contingent Valuation survey on the same sample of 
individuals. In line with the literature, we found that the two methods yield to 
statistically different results but the difference is smaller by using the CTCM rather 
than the traditional unitary TCM. 
In conclusion, this research showed that the Collective Travel Cost Method 
developed in this study can be implemented to yield individual welfare estimates 
potentially very useful for policy analysis in order to find the best management 
strategy for a natural area. We can asses the impact of policy changes on each 
household member and derive a measure of the incidence of a policy change on 
members within the household. 
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 Theoretically in the future the collective recreational demand model of 
Chapter 1 and the CTCM of Chapter 2 should be extended (i) by including corner 
solutions in the recreational demand; (ii) by considering the presence of children: 
indeed one of the limitations of these models is that they include children’s welfare by 
assuming that there is one altruistic household member that takes into account 
household members’ well-being; (iii) by addressing the issue of dynamics: household 
decisions are a dynamic process that involves a tradeoff between partners and 
different decisions overtime; (iv) by accounting for behavior of groups where 
individuals from different households choose to take a trip together and not only for 
the behavior of a family.  
Empirically in the future, new data sets should be assembled in an effort to 
fully apply the CTCM of Chapter 2 and to apply the recreational demand model of 
Chapter 1. The main caveat of this research is the small sample size and the fact that 
the survey used to apply the CTCM was not designed for this purpose but for 
estimating the traditional TCM. In the future the sample should include singles and 
couples with and without children. The survey should ask about the age of the 
children to better understand the effect of the children on the decision outcome. Then 
more detailed data about the spouse of the respondent should be collected. In 
particular questions about the age, the education, the employment status, the hourly 
wage, the weekly number of hours of work, the number of trips, the travel costs and 
the type of trips (if alone, if always with the other spouse, if with friends) of the 
spouse should be asked.  
By designing ad hoc questionnaires analysts may be able to provide policy 
makers with more efficient and accurate estimates of the value of environmental 
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 resources or public goods for each household member. Given accelerating concern 
over environmental issues, research in this vein can be expected to become 
increasingly important. This research agenda has only begun and will require 
significant effort on the part of environmental economists to identify the conditions 
under which improved welfare estimates can be obtained through such methods. 
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ANNEX 
West Garda Regional Forest Survey: A Platform for Policy Analysis 
 
Overview 
The West Garda Regional Forest survey was conducted by the Department of 
Economics of the University of Verona in the north-east of Italy, on the west side of 
Garda Lake, in June-October 1997. This survey is a primary source of information on 
the recreational demand, resource use and economic value of the natural, productive, 
protective and tourist functions of a public forest or park. It provides information 
about resident and non-resident visitors’ preferences and individual consumption. It 
considers not only the household’s total expenditures, but also the distribution and use 
among members. Such a survey can be used as an example to define policies that 
allow for interactions among institutions, local economic agents and the park’s users, 
while accounting for implications of those policies on the local economy. 
 
Study Site 
The High Garda Natural Park extends over an area of 38 000 hectares (Figure A1) in 
Lombardy region, in Brescia province. Moving from south to north over the west part 
of the lake, this area covers nine town councils: Salò, Gardone Riviera, Toscolano-
Maderno, Gargnano, Tignale, Tremosine, Limone sul Garda, Valvestino and Magasa. 
The Regional Forestry Agency of Lombardy region (ERSAF) is responsible for the 
management of the park side belonging to the region, called West Garda Regional 
Forest. This area extends over 11 064 hectares and represents the object of this 
survey. 
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Figure A1 - West Garda Regional Forest in Italy 
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Data Collection 
The survey was in the form of on-site48 interviews of random visitors found in the 
area of the West Garda Regional Forest. The questionnaire was anonymous and 
included ninety-seven questions. Respondents spent between twenty and thirty 
minutes answering all of the questions and, on average, ten people were interviewed 
per day. 
 
                                                 
48 Visitors were interviewed in the following places: Passo Spino (27.98 per cent of the respondents), Valvestino 
(17.17 per cent), Tignale (30 per cent), Tremosine (12.47 per cent), Tremalzo (4.16 per cent) and others locations 
(8 per cent). There were 400 respondents, but after skimming, the actual sample consists of 361 observations. 
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Survey Analysis 
The survey provides information about: 
I. the visit to the natural area; 
II. the quality of the natural area; 
III. the travel cost estimation; 
IV. the economic valuation: 
IV.1 the economic valuation of the natural area; 
IV.2 the economic valuation of the natural area’s functions; 
V. visitors’ socio-demographic characteristics. 
 
I. Characteristics of the Visit to the Natural Area 
On average 52 per cent of visitors come from Brescia province, 28 per cent of the 
respondents come from other provinces (for example Milan, Verona, Trento) and 20 
per cent consist of foreign tourists, of which 16 per cent are German (Figure A2). 
Twenty per cent of the respondents live in an owned vacation house, 20 per cent live 
in a friend’s house, 18 per cent in a hotel and 17 per cent rent a house (Figure A3). 
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Figure A2 – Respondent’s Nationality 
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Figure A3 – Respondent’s Lodge 
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II. Quality of the Natural Area 
West Garda Regional Forest is not a crowded area as Figure A4 shows. Only 25 per 
cent of the sample thinks that the area is crowded, 57 per cent of the respondents think 
that the level of crowding is low and 18 per cent think that the area is not crowded. 
The quality of the area is sufficient for 42 per cent of the sample, but 46 per cent of 
respondents think that it is good and 5 per cent think it is very good (Figure A5). 
Figure A4 – Crowding Level 
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Figure A5 – Quality of the Area 
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Figure A6, A7 and A8 investigate the quality of the natural area facilities. 
Regarding the accessibility to the area, 67 per cent of the respondents think that the 
outside parking is enough, though 25 per cent think that an adequate parking facility 
is missing. The roads inside the natural area are good for 61.5 per cent of the sample, 
however, 17 per cent think that the area needs more and 10 per cent do not want any 
infrastructures. About half of the respondents think that mountain bike paths and 
trekking paths are good, but 11 per cent of respondents do not want any mountain 
bike paths at all. If we consider picnic areas, we have 52 per cent of respondents that 
think they are good and 35 per cent that think they have to be improved. Concerning 
fishing areas, we have contradicting opinions: 42 per cent are not interested in fishing 
facilities, 27 per cent do not want these areas, 13 per cent of respondents consider 
them low quality and only 17 per cent think that they are good. 
We can see conflicting opinions about the trash areas: 50 per cent of the 
sample considers them good and 40 per cent believe that the natural area needs more 
of them. 
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Figure A6 – Quality of the Area Facilities 
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Other questions were asked about the quality of guides or naturalistic teaching 
programs: 23 per cent of respondents are not interested, 14 per cent do not want them 
and if 28 per cent think that they are good 35 per cent think that they need to be 
improved. The quality of road and educational signs in the natural area are considered 
good by 47 per cent of the sample, but low by 45 per cent. The per centage of 
respondents not interested in a security service is 22 per cent, while 42 per cent think 
that this service is good and 28 per cent feel that it has to be improved. Another 
question was about what respondents think about the fauna and flora variety of the 
area. While 88 per cent of the sample think that the flora is good and only 4 per cent 
think that the flora quality is low, 65 per cent had a positive opinion about the fauna 
and 23 per cent had negative views. In general, respondents think that the West Garda 
Regional Forest’s quality is good. 
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Figure A7 – Quality of the Area Facilities 
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Figure A8 – Quality of the Area Facilities 
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III. Travel Cost Estimation 
This section provides the researcher with all the information she needs for travel cost 
estimation (Figures A9, A10 and A11). It investigates what the respondent’s mean of 
transportation is; how many hours visitor traveled to go to the West Garda Regional 
Forest and to go to alternative sites; how many people traveled with her, how many 
were family members and how many shared the expense of the trip; if she stopped in 
other places before to come to the natural area; how many days the trip lasts; 
individual and family transportation expenditures for getting to the forest; individual 
and family expenditures in food, sleeping, free time activities during the trip and what 
is the maximum cost to go to the natural area. The respondent was asked to recall the 
number of annual trips made to West Garda Regional Forest and the number of trips 
to other natural areas in order to distinguish between visitors with a single-destination 
from those with multiple destinations. 
 
Figure A9 – Respondent’s Number of Trips (nva) to the West Garda Regional Forest 
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In order to double check the declared costs, the visitor was asked to specify 
their place of residence, the distance between the natural area and their residence, 
travel time and for those that were on vacation, the distance from the forest to the 
vacation lodging. In order to estimate the expenditure for the alternative sites, the 
visitor was asked about the distance from their residence, number of visits for each 
site, quality of the area and the purpose of the trip for each alternative site. 
The average number of visits per year to the West Garda Regional Forest is 
6.79, the average number of days per trip is 5.78, but visitors from Brescia province 
like more one day trips. 
 
Figure A10 – Number of Days per Visit 
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Figure A11 – Distance from Place of Residence (km) 
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IV. Economic Valuation 
This section is divided into two subsections, one about the value of the natural area 
and the other about the value of its functions. 
 
IV.1 Economic Valuation of the Natural Area 
Access to the forest is currently free. Respondents were asked whether they would be 
willing to pay an entrance ticket in order to improve the quality of the management 
and preservation of the area as well as their Willingness-To-Pay an annual 
subscription fee, which finances projects to improve the recreational activities. The 
survey was prepared following the guidelines by the NOAA49 panel. In order not to 
                                                 
49 Here we give a partial list of guidelines by the NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration) Panel (for a complete discussion about the NOAA guidelines see Arrow et al., 1993): 
1) face to face interviews with pre-test for interviewer effects in order to minimize non-response rates; 
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incur bias, in the introduction of the survey it is emphasized that the objective is to 
improve the area and that the prices are hypothetic. 
Before asking the Willingness-To-Pay a ticket, it is asked to give an opinion 
about the area: if it is crowed and if the number of visitors should be regulated. The 
average respondent thinks that the level of crowding is low and only 11 per cent of 
respondents think that the number of visitors has to be regulated. Visitors prefer 
regulating motored viability and that parking is outside the natural area. The average 
respondent is willing to pay an annual tax to preserve the natural area of about 20 
euro. 
 
IV.2 Economic Valuation of the Natural Area’s Functions 
A question about time use during the visit between functions offered by the area is 
made before asking Willingness-To-Pay a fee to improve the recreational activities of 
the area. On average, visitors spend about six hours in the natural area. The activities 
are divided into three categories: recreational, harvest and naturalistic (Figure A12 
and A13). 
Visitors spend about five hours in recreational activities such as trekking and 
picnicking. 80 per cent of respondents do these activities respectively for an hour and 
a half and two and a half hours. Other available activities are horse riding, mountain 
biking or visiting historic places. Respondents spend only fifteen minutes doing 
                                                                                                                                            
2) conservative design, when aspects of the survey design and analysis of the responses are ambiguous; 
c) elicit Willingness-To-Pay rather than Willingness-To-Accept; 
d) dichotomous choice referendum format; 
e) incorporate follow-up questions investigating the specific reasons why the respondent answered 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the payment questions; 
f) remind the respondent of substitute commodities; 
g) remind the respondent of budget constraint. 
 140
 
 
harvest activities such as hunting and fishing and about thirty-five minutes harvesting 
mushrooms and flowers. More time (about forty-five minutes) is spent in observing 
the landscape, flora and fauna. 
 
Figure A12 - Average Time of the Effective and Desired Recreational Activities (min) 
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Figure A13 - Average Time of the Effective and Desired Harvest and 
Naturalistic Activities (min) 
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V. Socio-economic Characteristics of the West Garda Regional Forest’s Visitors 
The average visitor is 39 years old, with a secondary education (about 13 years, 
Figure A14) and middle-high income (around 1807.6 euro, Figure A16). Figure A15 
show the job sector of respondents: 46 per cent works in service sector, 18 per cent in 
secondary sector, 2 per cent in primary sector and 34 per cent do not work (students, 
housewife, unemployed, retired). The expenditure in leisure is high since average 
visitor spends 10 per cent of her monthly income on leisure (about 185 euro) and 25 
per cent on food (426 euro). 
 142
 
 
Figure A14 – Respondent’s Education 
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Figure A15 – Respondent’s Job Sector 
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Figure A16 – Respondent’s Monthly Income 
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